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Abstract 
 
This thesis emphasizes the multidimensionality of political instability when examining 
whether financial crises may trigger political instability, and how financial crises and 
instability affect the growth rate of the economy. A total of 20 political instability indicators 
are used to make four indices of instability by means of Principal Component Analysis. These 
indices are thought to reflect different dimensions of political instability: political violence, 
civil protest, regime change and government instability.  
 
I use data for a panel of 148 countries over 35 years to investigate the questions put forth. The 
chosen quantitative approach employs a panel data regression model that emphasizes 
differences within and between the units being studied. 
 
Findings suggest that financial crises may trigger socio-political instability as measured by the 
indices of political violence and civil protest. I also uncover that political instability is highly 
contagious. Furthermore, financial crises have an expected negative effect on economic 
growth. The relationship between political instability and growth has been intensively 
discussed in the literature, and the many contradictory results have contributed to fueling this 
discussion. My findings of opposing effects confirm the appropriateness of modeling political 
instability as multidimensional. Only change of or in regimes affect the growth rate of the 
economy, but interestingly, government instability is positive, while regime changes are 
negative for growth. 
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1.0  Introduction 
 
In time, every crisis ends. But no crisis, especially one of this severity, passes without leaving 
a legacy (Joseph Stiglitz 2010). 
 
The quote above of course refers to the latest global financial crisis. After the U.S. subprime 
market exploded in 2007, the global economy was sent into recession. As financial contagion 
spread, output fell, unemployment rose, and governments stocked on debt to provide fiscal 
relief, many sceptics realized the true destructiveness of financial crises. The effect of 
financial crises on both the economy and the political environment is crucial to understand, 
particularly for policy makers trying to avoid new crashes. However, is the legacy that Stiglitz 
refers to the persistence of the financial shock on the real economy in post-crisis years? Or is 
it the political consequences of cleaning up the mess? And why have we not learned the 
legacies of previous financial crises? The global financial crises not only challenged certain 
truths about how the capitalist system works, it also produced a new wave of research on both 
the causes and consequences of financial crises. In 2008, Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia 
published a new database on banking crises, which have been updated in 2010. This data 
provides new opportunities for studying the political and economic consequences of crises. 
 
Last year, Zachary Davis and Thomas Carothers tried to evaluate some consequences of the 
latest financial crisis and the following economic downturn with respect to the effects on 
democracy and political stability. They comment that in more than 35% of the elections held 
in 2009, “frustrated citizens voted out incumbents […] including long-term ruling parties in 
Iceland, Japan and El Salvador.” Although they do not claim that the relationship is a causal 
one, they find it likely that the crisis greatly contributed to popular discontent, referring to 
massive street protest and the following resignation of the prime minister in Latvia, and the 
public anger observed in Greece due to their fiscal challenges (Davis and Carothers 2010). 
When considering political instability and social unrest due to a crisis, there might be large 
differences, particularly between democracies and autocracies. However, Davis and Carothers 
comment that in democracies “anger has largely been channeled through the ballot-box.” And 
although there were several democratic reversals in 2009 (for example in Honduras and 
Madagascar) nothing indicates economic distress as the main cause. The relative stability of 
all types of political regimes is found somewhat surprising to Davis and Carothers, but it may 
be that 2010 was too early for drawing conclusions. 
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This relative stability is also an argument for not focusing only on regime change, or the 
difference between the classic dichotomies democracy/autocracy, which may be limiting. 
Even in modern democracies, where government change is generally peaceful, political 
instability might still have important effects on the economic environment. Therefore, one 
may benefit by applying a wider lens on political turmoil. The Political Instability Index 
shows the level of threat posed to governments due to social protest (Economist Intelligence 
Unit 2010). Of the 165 countries evaluated in 2009/2010 nearly half are judged high risk or 
very high risk. Compared to the last publication in 2007, only two countries obtained a lower 
risk level, in twelve countries there was no change, and 151 countries are scored as having a 
higher risk of political instability.  
 
There exists a large literature studying the economic consequences of financial crises (i.e. 
Cerra and Saxena 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Reinhart and Reinhart 2010; Cavallo and 
Cavallo 2010). Not surprisingly, these studies mainly find financial crises to negatively affect 
economic growth, although some evidence also indicates that crises as a product of financial 
liberalization can be positive in the long-run (Rancière, Tornell and Westermann 2008). There 
is also a large literature that studies the economic consequences of political instability (i.e. 
Londregan and Poole 1990; Alesina, Özler, Roubini and Swagel 1996; Campos and Nugent 
2002). Richard Jong-A-Pin (2009) argues that the conception of political instability as one- or 
two-dimensional is mistaken, political instability is multidimensional, and this may explain 
some of the contradictory findings in the instability-growth literature. Studies considering the 
political effects of financial crises are rarer. However, many studies in comparative politics 
have examined political consequences of economic crises (i.e. O’Donnell 1973; Gasiorowski 
1995). More specifically, these studies focus on regime change and democratic breakdowns in 
periods of economic despair. This thesis connects three overlapping fields of research in its 
three main variables: financial crises, political instability and economic growth, and poses the 
following research question: 
 
1.1 Can financial crises trigger political instability? What effects do political instability 
and financial crises have upon long-term economic growth? 
 
The reason for studying economic growth is quite simple: it matters. High levels of income 
reflect high standards of living. And while one may argue that economic growth do not 
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automatically translate into welfare or higher quality of life, the standards of living, healthcare 
system, etc., observed in advanced rich countries are striking compared to the less-developed 
(Acemoglu 2009:7). This is also the reason why economists have been trying to identify what 
factors promotes growth, why the poor stay poor while the rich become richer, and why the 
prescribed medicine does not seem to work.  
 
1.2 Goals of the thesis 
This thesis has two main goals, reflected in the research question. The first analytical part of 
the thesis is exploratory. If political instability should be modeled as multidimensional, what 
determinants affect the different dimensions, and do financial crises trigger outbursts of 
violence, protest, or even changes in or of regimes? If the latter is established, how do we 
explain this relationship? I will argue that political instability is multidimensional, and much 
effort is put into modeling this concept and creating the measures reflecting different 
dimensions of political instability. A new contribution is also given through the efforts of 
trying to explain a possible framework for how crises create instability. The second part of 
this thesis is confirmatory. I review the literature both with regards to results and methods 
applied, to explain the variation in previous results. I introduce financial crises to the study of 
political instability and growth, and evaluate the appropriateness of modeling instability as 
multidimensional. A multidimensional operationalization may explain the varying results in 
the past, as indicators of instability have been rammed together in indices without taking 
dimensionality into account.  
 
The thesis will focus on the three main variables of interest and the relationship between 
these. In addition to emphasizing the multidimensionality of political instability, this thesis 
will discuss the uncritical use of economic growth measures in the literature, and stress the 
importance of choosing a domestic price-adjusted measure of growth rates to avoid 
measurement bias. I also emphasize within- and between modeling of the relationships. This 
way of empirically testing growth hypotheses challenges the standard fixed effects techniques 
normally applied by econometricians in growth studies, and is also of substantial interest 
since one thereby isolates whether the estimated effects primarily vary within or between 
countries. 
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1.3 Short preview of central findings 
I find clear indications that modeling political instability as multidimensional is appropriate. 
Following Sanders (1981) and Jong-A-Pin (2009), I make four indices of political instability 
using Principal Component Analysis, which reflect different dimensions of the phenomena: 
political violence, civil protest, regime change and government instability. I also find the 
methodological approach applied in this thesis to be beneficial. Modeling specific within- and 
between-effects have several benefits concerning efficiency, including constant variables, and 
treating endogeneity. 
 
The findings of the analyses show that financial crises may trigger political instability, but 
that only some types of instability seem to be the product of crises. Crises can lead to socio-
political unrest (political violence; civil protest), but no evidence is found that crises increase 
the occurrence of executive/regime instability (regime change; government instability). I also 
find that political instability is highly contagious. Events of political instability typically lead 
to the occurrence of other events of instability. The effect of financial crises on growth is 
found to be consistently negative, and the effect of political instability on growth is found to 
be contradictory depending on the dimension of instability. Regime change is negative for 
growth, while government instability is positive for growth. The latter result is also shown to 
be sensitive to the exclusion of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The next chapter (2) presents the theoretical background, literature survey and a 
methodological review concerning previous studies of political instability and growth. I will 
start by defining and discussing different measures of financial crises in section 2.1. 
Following this, section 2.2 concerns political instability. Here, I define and discuss the 
development in studies of political instability from one- and two-dimensional, to a 
multidimensional view of political instability. Section 2.3 establishes the relationship between 
financial crises and political instability. Other possible determinants of political instability are 
discussed, and hypotheses of the expected effects are presented. Section 2.4 presents the 
relationship between financial crises and economic growth, and hypotheses of the expected 
effects are introduced. Section 2.5 concerns the relationship between political instability and 
growth. First, the empirical results from past studies are described. Second, the theoretical 
explanations for these observed correlations are presented, and the expected effect is 
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presented. Section (2.6) gives a methodological review of past studies of political instability 
and growth, and describes the problem faced when examining this relationship. The chapter 
summary (2.7) summarizes the main points. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology of the analyses. First, the benefits of panel data analysis 
are explained. The chapter continues by describing the difference of fixed- and random-
effects, how some of the problems with random-effects models may be solved by applying 
within- and between-analysis, before I justify my choice of estimation technique. Following 
this is a short presentation of interaction effects, and some econometrical challenges and 
assumptions in panel data models.  
 
Chapter 4 present the data and measurements applied in the analysis. Section 4.1 discusses the 
measure of economic growth. Section 4.2 presents the variables of political instability. I use 
20 variables common in the literature to create four indices by means of principal component 
analysis. Section 4.3 describes the chosen measure of financial crises, which is the banking 
crises variable. The last section (4.4) shortly describes the control variables to be employed in 
both analyses. 
 
Chapter 5 contains the analyses. Section 5.1 is the analysis of financial crises and political 
instability. Or more specifically, financial crises and political violence (5.1.1), civil protest 
(5.1.2), regime change (5.1.3) and government instability (5.1.4). Section 5.1.5 discusses the 
results. Section 5.2 present the result of the growth analysis and discuss the findings. Lastly, 
section 5.3 contains some sensitivity tests of the method applied and central findings. 
 
Chapter 6 concludes, with a summary of results, contribution of the findings, and suggestions 
for further research. 
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2.0 Theoretical Framework and Literature Survey 
 
In this part I will establish and define the concepts of financial crisis and political instability. 
Also, it is necessary to ascertain how financial crisis may lead to political instability and how 
both instability and crises affect the prospects of long-term economic growth. The relationship 
between the political and economic environment is most likely endogenous. While financial 
crises affect growth directly, it also has political consequences that may influence growth 
further down the line. In addition, economic growth might impact both the political stability 
and the prospects of financial crisis in a given country. Furthermore, since the political 
environment critically affects economic variables, it is also possible that political instability 
may contribute to, or trigger, financial crises. This magnitude of possible reciprocity and 
simultaneity needs to be taken into account, to be able to properly specify, model and estimate 
the processes at work.  
 
Relationship of interest: 
 
Financial crisis  Political instability  Economic growth 
 
Possible reciprocity, simultaneity, and feedback effects: 
 
 
The first issue at hand is to define and discuss the concepts of financial crises and political 
instability. Following this, the relationship between financial crises and political instability is 
discussed, in addition to other determinants of political instability. This constitutes the 
theoretical basis for the first exploratory part of the thesis. Next, the connection between 
financial crises and growth, and political instability and growth is treated. This make up the 
theoretical basis for the second confirmatory part of the thesis. The last part of this chapter 
gives a methodological review mostly concerned with the many previous studies of political 
instability and growth.  
 
Financial crisis Political instability 
Economic 
growth 
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2.1 What are financial crises? 
Financial crises are a reoccurring and continuously surprising feature of the capitalist system. 
In fact, financial crises have become more common since World War II, firstly due to poor 
macroeconomic policies under the Bretton Woods regime, and secondly due to financial 
liberalization in the post-Bretton Woods regime (Knoop 2008: 213). Despite economists’ 
increasingly advanced theories of both its origins and predictability, crises have appeared 
regularly, although not in a constant cyclical manner, over time. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) 
comment that: “periods of high international capital mobility have repeatedly produced 
international banking crises, not only famously as they did in the 1990s, but historically.” It is 
therefore central to understand the political and economical consequences of financial crises. 
 
Definitions and indicators 
There are many types of financial crises and they can be both damaging and contagious. 
When recession or depression follows, the effects of financial crisis on the real economy can 
be severe. The causes of previous financial crises are many: “unsustainable macroeconomic 
policies (…), excessive credit booms, large capital inflows, and balance sheet fragilities,  
combined with policy paralysis due to a variety of political and economic constraints” 
(Laeven and Valencia 2008:3). It is common to differentiate between domestic and external 
crisis origins. As examples of crises with external origins, Cavallo and Cavallo (2010:842) 
mention current account reversals defined as “a reduction in the current account deficit of a 
certain percentage of GDP in on year.” The concept of “sudden stops” is defined as “an 
unexpected reduction in net capital inflows.” Both these crisis can possibly also trigger a 
currency crisis (Frankel 2005). Such a crisis can be defined as a “nominal depreciation of the 
currency of at least 30 percent that is also at least a 10 percent increase in the rate of 
depreciation compared to the year before” (Laeven and Valencia 2008:6). Crises with 
domestic origins are exemplified by inflationary crises and balance of payment crises created 
by domestic fiscal imbalances (Cavallo and Cavallo 2010:842). Debt crises, on the other 
hand, can have both domestic and external origins. Manasse, Schimmenpfennig and Roubini 
(2003) defines countries as having debt crises if “it is classified as being in default by 
standards and poor’s or if it receives a large non-concessional IMF loan defined as access in 
excess of 100% quota.”  
 
An important aspect of financial crises is that of contagion, which can be defined as “the 
process by which a shock in one part of the financial system spreads to other parts through a 
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series of ‘linkages’” (Allen and Gale 2007). Some economic shocks are correlated across 
countries and would thus be felt by many countries, in addition, real shocks can spread 
through trade linkages and financial linkages (Knoop 2008:199). Because of market herding 
and self-fulfilling tendencies, the power of information and expectations are also central in 
understanding contagion. The feature of contagion has become a central characteristic of 
financial crises, especially of the post-1980 crises (Knoop 2008:198). Allen and Gale 
(2007:25) elaborate on contagion:  
 
A fall in prices on one market may be interpreted as a negative signal about fundamentals. If these 
fundamentals are common to other markets, the expected returns and hence prices on those markets 
will also fall. Similarly, if one currency depreciates, other countries with common fundamentals may 
find that their currency also depreciates. 
 
Typically, a crisis is measured by low values of some macroeconomic variable(s) relative to a 
level of reference. The problem using this approach is deciding how much deterioration 
constitutes a crisis (Drazen 2000: 449). Examples of this approach are inflation (high-inflation 
crisis) and growth in GDP per capita (negative growth), or debt-crisis as measured by the 
current-account deficit or total indebtedness. A second approach to measure financial crises is 
to make a crises-index like that of Reinhart and Reinhart (2010). The BCDI- index measures 
banking, currency, default and inflation crises, and weights the varieties of crises taking place 
in a given country in a given year against the country’s share of world income (Reinhart and 
Reinhart 2010:5). Another possible way of studying financial crises, which capture a 
multitude of financial phenomena and the feature of contagion, is that of banking crises 
(Laeven and Valencia 2008). Knoop (2010:163) defines banking crisis as “a situation in 
which numerous banks fail simultaneously, leading to a significant reduction in bank credits 
as well as other forms of financial intermediation.” Since the banking sector is highly 
vulnerable to a variety of factors and events, both domestic and external, this concept captures 
several relevant forms of financial distress. Laeven and Valencia (2008:5) defines a systemic 
banking crisis as occurring when “a country’s corporate and financial sectors experience a 
large number of defaults and financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties 
repaying contracts on time.” Because of its nature as an “incident”, financial crises measured 
as banking crises escapes the problem of deciding a deterioration threshold in long time-series 
of some macroeconomic variable(s).  
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Knoop (2008:194) observe that financial crises have been twice as frequent in the period 
1973-1997 compared to before 1913, and almost all of this increase is driven by the number 
of currency crises. However, when he compares the post-Bretton Woods period to the Bretton 
Woods period (1945-1971), it is discovered that the frequency of financial crises as currency 
crises have declined, while the number of banking crises have increased dramatically. These 
banking crises have also “become increasingly associated with currency crises” (Knoop 
2008:195). Typically, the occurrence of concurrent currency and banking crises are referred to 
as twin crises. According to Knoop (2008), twin crises have become a distinct feature of 
financial crises. In the Bretton Woods era, financial crises were usually more predictable and 
explainable as they were associated with obvious bad macroeconomic policy.  
 
The common feature across different types of financial crises that are relevant for this thesis 
consists of the fact that it has real economic consequences, may be contagious, and that it 
creates the need for political action. While the BCDI-index gives a measure of the severity 
and global importance of different crises, the banking crises indicator indicates the occurrence 
of crises and the duration. However, when creating an index, different time frames for the 
different measures may limit the sample period. Cavallo and Cavallo (2010:842) find that the 
banking crisis indicator is “more than twice more correlated” with other crisis variables than 
any other indicator. Based on these findings I choose to proxy financial crises based on the 
banking crisis variable. The choice of indicator and operationalization will be elaborated on 
further in section 4.3.  
 
 
2.2 Political instability 
Political instability as qualitative phenomena, are difficult to measure quantitatively and not 
easily defined. Political instability can be measured by both events and perceptions, the latter 
being least celebrated. The ambiguity about the meaning of this concept has led to application 
of a wide range of measures and an array of definitions. As we shall see, this has led to 
accusations of misspecification, errors of measurement, mistaken causal linkages, and 
problems of comparability. The goal of this section is to review the history of this concept and 
arrive at the dimensions of political instability which are relevant for the purpose of this 
thesis. With this in mind it is natural to focus on the discussion within the instability-growth 
literature.  
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Defining political instability 
Is political instability simply the opposite of political stability? According to an early 
definition by Lipset (1960), a politically stable country had been a democracy or autocracy for 
at least 25 years (Miljkovic and Rimal 2008:2455). This definition would mean that political 
instability was just the non-persistency in form of government, no matter what type of rule. 
Sanders (1981:5) related political instability to legitimacy of the political system, and thus a 
political system could only be more or less stable compared to it or other systems. This also 
suggests that individuals can be dissatisfied, loose confidence in the political system and act 
on their discontent. The predominant view of political instability builds on both these 
definitions. Social unrest and civil disobedience may manifest itself through civil society, 
creating socio-political tension and a possible threat to political regimes. There is also another 
view, relating political instability to changes within the confines of institutional democracy, as 
different preferences produce changes in governments (Miljkovic and Rimal 2008:2455). 
 
One- and two-dimensional studies 
Browsing through the literature one will quickly establish that two common understandings of 
political instability are central. The first emphasizes executive instability and the second social 
and political unrest. In the first approach, political instability defined as executive instability 
is the “propensity to observe government changes” (Alesina and Perotti 1996:1205). Here, 
one differentiates between constitutional and unconstitutional government changes, that is, 
changes can take place within the law or outside, i.e. coups d’état. The second approach 
focuses on socio-political instability defined as phenomena of social unrest and political 
violence. This constitutes civil-society induced manifestations of political instability. 
 
Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) two dimensions of political instability: 
Regime-related instability: coups d’état, governmental crisis, purges, cabinet changes. 
Instability induced by civil-society: assassinations, general strikes, guerilla warfare, 
riots, revolutions, anti-governmental demonstrations. 
 
Feng (2003:51-52) conceives political instability as changes of government. He emphasizes 
the difference between irregular and regular government change on the one hand, and major 
and minor government change on the other hand. One may argue that major and minor 
changes of government have different impact on growth, but the difference turn pale when 
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compared to irregular and regular changes. As Feng (2003:52) states: “It is certainly difficult 
to consider the power transfer from Prime Minister James Callaghan to Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher as having the same policy implications as that from President Salvador 
Allende to General Augusto Pinochet…” Even though both events should be classified as 
major government change, the qualitative difference is obvious.  
 
Feng’s (2003) conception of political instability as government change: 
 
Regular    Irregular 
 
Minor change   Constitutional power   Irrelevant 
    transfer within the  
same party. 
 
Major change   Constitutional alternation  Coup d’état 
in office. Callaghan/Thatcher . Allende/Pinochet. 
 
Multidimensional studies 
According to Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) the most frequently used measures of 
political instability fall into three categories: government stability, social unrest/stability, and 
political violence. They argue that the diversity of measures and different subsets of these 
used in different studies makes the results non-comparable (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 
2005:630). Nonetheless, some measures are more common than others, like revolutions, 
coups, and assassinations. In an attempt to organize a conceptually confused field, Butkiewicz 
and Yanikkaya (2005:633) categorize 17 measures of political instability into the above 
mentioned categories: 
 
Government stability:      Social Stability:          Political violence:  
Coups External conflict risk Political protests 
Revolutions Civil war risk Assassinations 
Cabinet changes Political terrorism Purges 
Anti-government 
demonstrations 
Racial and nationality 
tensions 
Deaths from political 
violence 
Government crisis  Riots 
  General strikes 
  War casualties 
  War (on national territory) 
 
At first glance, some of the measures found under political violence, could just as well have 
been categorized under social stability (i.e. strikes, riots, protests), and thereby leaves the 
question of whether such a categorization is appropriate. With the latter in mind, I will not 
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focus on this categorization, but it is included since it gives a good overview of different 
measures and the problem of categorizing indicators.  
 
Jong-A-Pin (2009) examines the multidimensionality of political instability and arrives at four 
main dimensions: (1) politically motivated violence; (2) mass civil protest; (3) instability 
within the political regime; (4) and instability of the political regime. The author comments 
that previous studies of the effect of political instability on growth have mainly been one-
dimensional, which may imply both errors of measurement and incorrect specifications of the 
causal linkage between instability and growth (Jong-A-Pin 2009:15). To arrive at these 
dimensions the author applies a factor analysis approach to 25 indicators of political 
instability.1 This way, the categorization is also based on statistical techniques. 
 
Sanders (1981) proposed similar dimensions: (1) violent challenges to regime or government, 
(2) peaceful challenges to either, (3) change in regime, and (4) change in government. The 
first two dimensions capture challenges to the regime, while the latter two make up actual 
changes of the regime or government. However, Jong-A-Pin (2009:26) do not fully agree with 
this set up because, as he states: “the third dimension [instability within the regime] clearly 
not only refers to actual changes, but also the potential for change as reflected by, i.e., the 
number of elections and the degree of fractionalization”. 
 
Sanders (1981) multidimensional framework of political instability: 
(1) Violent challenges to regime or government. 
(2) Peaceful challenges to regime or government. 
(3) Change in regime. 
(4) Change in government. 
 
Jong-A-Pin’s (2009) multidimensional framework of political instability: 
(1) Politically motivated violence. 
(2) Mass civil protest. 
(3) Instability within the political regime. 
(4) Instability of the political regime. 
 
                                                 
1
 Because of the mere quantity, all these are not listed here. See Jong-A-Pin (2009: 27). 
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Discussion 
Although both Sanders (1981) and Jong-A-Pin (2009) emphasize four dimensions of political 
instability they still reflect the two basic elements. Politically motivated violence and mass 
civil protest reflect socio-political unrest or civil-society induced instability, while political 
instability within and of the regime reflect government and regime change and instability.  
 
Socio-political unrest / civil-society induced instability: 
 - Politically motivated violence / violent challenges to regime or government. 
 - Mass civil protest / peaceful challenges to regime or government. 
 
Regime change / executive instability (minor, major, regular, irregular): 
 - Instability within the political regime / change in government. 
 - Instability of the political regime / change in regime. 
 
According to Carmignani (2003), the dimension of socio-political unrest may manifest itself 
through ethno-linguistic, religious, ideological and economic conflicts. Such high level of 
social unrest and conflict may disrupt market activities, directly affecting investment or 
growth for other reasons than the uncertainty associated with government turnover. Sources 
for government change, on the other hand, can result from interactions between represented 
interests in institutions and the electorate (Carmignani 2003). The probability of government 
change is usually related to economic, political, social and institutional variables. With a high 
propensity to executive changes comes political uncertainty and possibly threats to property 
rights (Alesina and Perotti 1996:1203). 
 
When is what dimension relevant to include? Alesina and Perotti (1996) comment that this 
must depend on the specific issue under consideration. Studies of political instability and 
growth most commonly focus on only one dimension alone, for example coups d’état. A large 
literature investigate the effects of political instability induced by inequality on growth, these 
studies typically focus on socio-political unrest, as this is the dimension of instability linking 
inequality to growth (Alesina and Perotti 1996).  It is of course central to avoid both errors of 
measurement and incorrect specification of the causal relationship. In many cases, it may be 
problematic to represent political instability through a single variable reflecting only one 
dimension of the phenomena. On the other hand, it is also problematic to include 25 measures 
of political instability as explanatory variables. To reflect several components of political 
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instability, many authors therefore use indices created by several indicators that proxy 
different phenomenon of instability. Blanco and Grier (2009:77) argue that principal 
component analysis (PCA) is an efficient way to capture the multidimensionality of political 
instability. Fosu (2001) tests different specifications of political instability on growth in an 
augmented production function framework. His results indicate that principal component 
indices provide no misspecification of the relationship between instability and growth. 
However, when political instability is measured by separate indicators, this yields poor fit, 
misspecification and underestimation of the relationship.  
 
Table 1 gives an overview of the development in studies using political instability as main 
explanatory variable. In this table, one-dimensional studies refer to those in which indicators 
covering only one dimension of political instability are used. Studies said to cover two 
dimensions both include some indicator of socio-political unrest and regime instability. Those 
studies categorized as multidimensional makes the distinction even more explicit with 
subcategories for socio-political unrest and regime instability. These studies include many 
indicators of political instability and test both aggregate effects of many indicators, and 
individual effects of single indicators. Comparing different indices in the literature, Jong-A-
Pin (2009:21) finds that the index applied by Barro (1991) and Perotti (1996) primarily 
reflects politically motivated violence, while that of Alesina et al. (1996) is the only one that 
is moderately related to three out of four dimensions.2 None of the indices evaluated reflected 
instability within regimes well, and were only weakly related to instability of the regime.  
 
Alesina and Perotti (1996:1206) suggest an identifying assumption for choosing whether to 
focus primarily on indicators of socio-political unrest or government change: “for a given 
level of expected government turnover, phenomena of social unrest do not have any direct 
impact on policy uncertainty, and therefore economic decisions” (italics in original). One 
argument for focusing on government change is therefore that the only policy changes that are 
relevant for economic decisions occur when government change. This assumption may be to 
strong. To capture the effect of financial crisis on political instability, firstly, and the effect of 
political instability on growth secondly, it is likely that only government change is to narrow a 
focus. In order to cover the important phenomena of political instability, it is necessary to 
include measures that reflect events of the two basic elements at a minimum. 
                                                 
2
 Alesina and Perotti (1996) apply the same indicators as Perotti (1996). 
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As Jong-A-Pin (2009:15) suggest, it is ample evidence from political science that political 
instability is multidimensional, even though no consensus on the appropriate number of 
dimensions has been reached. I choose here to follow up on this research trend emphasizing 
the multidimensionality of political instability in the growth literature. With a 
multidimensional operationalization of political instability, and a quantitative model that 
allows for it, one would be able to differentiate between variations in political instability both 
within and between countries over time. My hope is that this will allow me to capture political 
events due to financial crises that are both constitutional and unconstitutional in nature, and 
different types of events that may have more or less severe consequences for policy and 
uncertainty affecting economic growth.  
 
 
2.3 Financial crisis and political instability 
Studies concerned with political consequences of economic crisis are a long-standing tradition 
in comparative politics. O’Donnell (1973) argued that democratic breakdowns in Brazil and 
Argentina were caused by economic crises, and occurred when powerful political actors 
believed the crises could not be resolved under “incorporating” regimes and therefore 
replaced them with “exclusionary” bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (Gasiorowski 
1995:883). Gasiorowski (1995:892) found strong support that economic crises trigger 
democratic breakdowns. Following this, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 
(1996:42) conclude that: “The fragility of democracy at lower levels of development flows 
largely from its vulnerability in the face of economic crisis.” In their seminal study, 
articulating a formal theory of political transitions, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001:939) 
emphasize that “regime changes are more likely during recessionary periods because costs of 
political turmoil, both to the rich and to the poor, are lower during such episodes.” On the 
other hand, Haggard and Kaufman (1995:26) found that economic crises appeared to 
accelerate and possibly cause the collapse of authoritarian regimes in many countries, 
especially in Latin America. This part will not examine regime change or transitions in 
particular, but establish more specifically how financial crises may lead to political instability 
and what the determinants of political instability are. 
 
Theory and empirics 
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Consider the following supposition to illustrate a situation where financial crisis operate as a 
critical juncture affecting political instability and growth. Alesina et al. (1996:191) suggest 
that the interaction between growth and political instability can lead to a vicious circle: for 
some exogenous reason (i.e. political conflict) the likelihood of a government collapsing 
increases. Investment and growth fall as a result of the shock leading to further uncertainty 
and increasing the likelihood of government collapse. Now, reverse the situation: an 
exogenous economic shock (i.e. a financial crisis) leads to a rapid fall in growth. The public 
holds the government responsible for the poor economic situation, thereby increasing tension, 
frustration and unrest. This increase in the probability of executive collapse creates 
uncertainty, slowing growth even more.  
 
According to Bussière and Mulder (2000) the political setting prevailing at the time a crisis 
erupts is a central factor for determining the depth of the following recession. They estimate 
the effect of political instability on the severity of the economic crisis during the 1994 
“Tequila crisis” and the 1997 Asian crisis. The findings indicate that “political instability does 
matter for countries with low reserves or weak fundamentals” (Bussière and Mulder 
2000:326). The results from this study are relevant here since it implicates that in 
economically vulnerable countries, political instability may enhance the effects of a crisis, 
prolonging recession, and decreasing growth.  
 
An illustrative example may contribute to understanding the possible connection between 
financial crises and political instability. In 1994, several major events caused political 
instability in Mexico. The Zapatistas staged an uprising in the southern state of Chiapas, and 
both the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and new market 
oriented policies led to mass protests (Blanco and Grier 2009:79). This may have contributed 
to the financial crisis that erupted the same year when investors came to be wary of investing 
in the region and risk premiums went up (Hufbauer and Schott 2005).3 The following year, in 
1995, Mexico experienced eight political assassinations, one incident of guerilla warfare, five 
anti-government demonstrations, and nine revolutionary events (Banks 2005). 
 
Blanco and Grier (2009:81) illustrate the magnitude of this politically turbulent period 
graphically, and conclude that their index of nine indicators of political instability captures the 
                                                 
3
 The “peso crisis” of late 1994 had negative economic effects for the southern cone of America (popularly 
known as the “tequila effect”) and caused an economic crisis and recession in Mexico. The “peso crisis” as the 
name indicates, qualifies as a currency crisis.  
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magnitude of political instability in this example well. The case illustrate that financial crisis 
might contribute to political instability, especially in an already fragile situation, as Bussière 
and Mulders findings suggest. On the other hand, it shows that political instability can also 
contribute to creating periods of financial despair as investors flee markets and rating agencies 
dump their estimates of a countries public debt. 
 
H1: Financial crises increase political instability. 
 
Figure 1: The evolution of political instability in Mexico.  
 
Source: Blanco and Grier (2009:81) 
 
Determinants of political instability 
 
Income 
Blanco and Grier (2009:86) consider two reasons why poor economic performance are 
thought to cause political instability. First, low or falling income lower the opportunity cost of 
an individual to rise up, protest or revolt. Second, deprivation is increased as a result of poor 
economic conditions. This fuels political instability “as citizens perceive their government to 
be incompetent” (ibid). In this manner, financial crises can lead to political instability by 
lowering growth and worsening economic conditions. It has also been showed empirically 
that low income growth may feed instability (Annett 2000; Blomberg and Hess 2002).  
 
H2: High income decreases political instability. 
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H2A: Financial crises decrease income, thereby increasing political instability. 
 
Inflation 
Inflation is a possible macroeconomic factor influencing the stability of regimes. In their 
study of inflation and political instability, Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) find that 
high (or volatile) inflation can be destabilizing and that politically weak governments are 
more likely to resort to seignorage. Paldam (1987) demonstrated that in the period 1946-1983, 
almost no regime in Latin America survived an experience of hyperinflation. 
 
H3: High inflation increases political instability. 
 
Economic inequality 
When social and economic inequality is large, financial crisis may exaggerate existing 
conflict lines as the poor becomes poorer and the rich needs protection to sustain production 
and growth. Where the poor bail-out the rich, we may see more political instability. If this is 
true then we could expect to see more instability due to crises of an economic nature in 
countries with an uneven distribution of income. 
 
How do individuals react to socio-economic inequality? With high inequality and a polarized 
distribution of resources organized individuals will have incentives to pursue their interest 
outside the normal channels of both political representation and market activities (Perotti 
1996:151). Individuals in unequal societies are therefore “more prone to engage in rent-
seeking activities or other manifestations of socio-political instability, such as violent protests, 
assassinations, and coups” (ibid). Muller (1985:53) comment that: “It seems plausible to 
expect that in societies with high inequality, where the distribution or scope of discontent is 
presumably widespread, discontent is more likely to be mobilized somehow, than in societies 
with low inequality.” Financial crises are likely to create discontent towards those that are rich 
on resources and potentially also with the government in office who “let it happen”.  
 
H4: High economic inequality increases political instability. 
 
Trade 
Donovan et al. (2005) argue that if trade openness increases growth then this may negatively 
affect political instability. Goldstone et al. (2005:26) observe that countries in the low 
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percentile of openness were found to have two/three times higher probability of political 
instability than those in the high percentile. However, in the wake of a financial crisis this 
effect may be more complicated. Open economies may be more vulnerable to economic 
shocks. If (global) trade declines, then export revenues and tax incomes may fall sharply. 
Gottschalk and Bolton (2009:1) commented on the effects of the recent financial crisis that 
developing countries recovered faster from the financial crises during the 1990s and early 
2000s because they could export their way out of the crisis. However, due to the global nature 
of the recent financial crisis, this possibility was not as prominent. Not all financial crises are 
of a global nature, but it seems likely that crises with a regional scope also may have regional 
trade effects at a minimum.  
 
H5: Trade openness decreases political instability. 
 
Government spending and debt 
Financial crises demand a governmental policy response. Government spending is therefore 
central to the political and economic outcome of a crisis. Annett (2000) find that government 
spending is associated with lower political instability, while an earlier study by Cuzan, 
Moussalli and Bundrick (1988) finds the opposite for Latin American countries. The effect of 
government spending due to a crisis will most likely depend on the institutional setting and 
how is it financed. With regard to this, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008:45) comment that “the true 
legacy of banking crises is higher public indebtedness—far over and beyond the direct 
headline costs of big bailout packages.” Highly indebted countries have fewer fiscal 
maneuvering possibilities than countries with balanced budgets. A financial crisis may 
therefore require harder structural reform in highly indebted countries, which may be 
unpopular.  
 
H6: Government spending decreases political instability.  
H7: High indebtedness increases political instability. 
 
Regime 
According to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2003) underlying institutional problems are 
the main cause of poor economic performance. In crisis periods, bad political institutions may 
well be associated with distortionary policies. Cavallo and Cavallo (2010) focus on the 
institutional difference in democracies and autocracies in determining the economic 
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consequences of financial crises. During a crisis there is a re-shuffling of interest groups and a 
race to influence decision-makers. These different groups may promote myopic or good 
policies. Since democracies are inclusive by definition, they channel interests and unrest 
through participatory arrangements. In autocracies, however, rights and access to political 
institutions may be limited, leading unrest to manifest itself violently more easily if other 
expressions are restricted. Several studies find that democracy is an important factor for 
political stability (Feng 1997; Goldstone et al. 2004; Blanco and Grier 2009). 
 
H8: Democratic institutions decrease political instability. 
 
Regional instability 
Ades and Chua (1997) show that political instability in neighboring countries has negative 
effects on economic performance due to disruption of trade flows and increased defense 
expenditure. Blanco and Grier (2009:84) suggest that political instability can be contagious 
since instability in neighboring countries may cause refugee floods, revolutionary groups, 
ideologies and guerilla armies to cross borders. Goldstone et al. (2004) find countries in 
unstable regions more likely to experience instability, while Blanco and Grier (2009:88) find 
no evidence of regional contagion in Latin America.  
 
H9: Regional instability in neighboring countries increases political instability. 
 
Social inequality 
Socio-demographic conditions, such as racial and lingual characteristics, have been shown to 
have a positive effect on political instability (Blanco and Grier 2009:85). The basic intuition is 
that more fragmented or fractionalized countries are more prone to instability because socially 
unequal or divided countries are more likely to experience conflict between competing groups 
along latent ethnic, lingual and religious lines (Annett 2000). The most widely applied 
measure of fractionalization is ethnic and linguistic fractionalization.  
 
H10: Social inequality increases political instability. 
 
Other factors 
Many other factors than the above mentioned are also discussed in the literature as risk factors 
for instability. Another regime-related factor is the durability of the regime, since duration 
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may have different effects on instability in different regimes. Factionalism has been argued to 
be negative for the stability. Where there are conflicts residing within the political parties, 
levels of instability have been found to be higher (Blanco and Grier 2009; Benton 2007). 
Some socio-demographic variables are also commonly included on regressions with political 
instability as the dependent variable, i.e. urbanization and economic discrimination (Blanco 
and Grier 2009).  
 
 
2.4 Financial crises and growth 
This part will discuss theory and empirical findings of how financial crises affect economic 
growth. Lastly, I present hypothesis based on the main arguments. 
 
Theory 
There are mainly two opposing views for whether economic crises are positive or negative for 
long-term growth. The first view emphasize that crisis are negative for growth, both in the 
short and long-run, because short run destabilizing effects of central macroeconomic variables 
has adverse effects on output volatility in the long run (Cavallo and Cavallo 2010:838). The 
second view upholds that crises are positive for long run growth, although they have negative 
immediate effects. The reasoning behind this argument is that crises allow important reforms 
and learning processes to take place (ibid). Drazen (2000) refers to this as the “crisis 
hypothesis”. Some also argue that crises can be good if they are “side-effects of growth-
enhancing policies such as financial liberalization” (Cavallo and Cavallo 2010:838). 
 
Cavallo and Cavallo (2010) look at the role of political institutions in determining if crisis are 
good for long-term growth. In their view, crises are periods in time where important decisions 
are made. They constitute critical junctures. The impact on long-term growth could depend 
on both the type of political institutions and the kind of political compromise that the 
institutional set-up delivers. “Policy responses will be shaped by the incentives and 
constraints faced by the key political actors during the time of crisis” (Cavallo and Cavallo 
2010:839). This is in line with the argument by Tommasi (2004) that the quality and 
effectiveness of policy reforms are conditioned by the overall institutional environment of the 
country. On one side, democracy might ensure inclusiveness and constraints on arbitrary 
decisions, but on the other side, democracies and public debate may prolong the decision-
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making process leaving the crisis un-tackled for a longer period of time (Cavallo and Cavallo 
2010:839). Autocracies, then, might be able to implement reform more rapidly. This, 
however, does not guarantee that the reforms are high-quality. 
 
Empirical findings 
What Cavallo and Cavallo (2010) find is that crises are always disruptive in the long-run. 
They do, however, also find that democratic institutions may mitigate the effects, while 
autocratic governments can greatly amplify the negative outcome of a crisis. This result leads 
them to warn that the common moral-hazard view, that countries should experience crises to 
learn from their mistakes, can be misleading if the institutional environment is ignored. Cerra 
and Saxena (2008) find that there are large persistent output losses associated with financial 
crises and some types of political crises. A contradictory finding is made by Rancière et al. 
(2008); they show that countries which have experienced financial crises have grown faster on 
average than countries with stable financial conditions. Their results indicate that systemic 
risk has a positive effect on growth, although it produces occasional financial crises. The 
finding also implies that financial liberalization strengthens financial development and leads 
to higher long-run growth (Rancière et al. 2008:403).  
 
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009:466) there are three common characteristics in the 
aftermath of financial crises. First, asset markets and equity prices collapse, and real housing 
prices decline. Second, output and employment decline. Third, government debt explodes. 
The latter they find not to be primarily because of large bailout costs, but due to a collapse in 
tax revenues and ambitious countercyclical fiscal policies. Reinhart and Reinhart (2010:37) 
find that large destabilizing events (banking crises, currency crises, inflation crises, sovereign 
default and stock-market crashes) cause changes in key macroeconomic indicators well after 
the crisis-turmoil have passed. Their results suggest that: “Real per capita GDP growth rates 
are significantly lower during the decade following severe financial crises and the 
synchronous world-wide shocks” (Reinhart and Reinhart (2010:2). The first hypothesis is 
therefore: 
 
H11: Financial crises decrease economic growth. 
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However, Rancière et al. 2008 findings indicate that financial liberalization may be better in 
the long run since it is growth-enhancing, although liberalized countries are more vulnerable 
to crises. And the moral hazard view emphasizes the positive learning process of crises 
episodes. Consequently, a contradictory hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H11A: Financial crises have positive long-run effects on growth. 
 
Cavallo and Cavallo’s (2010) results suggest that democratic institutions perform better 
during crisis than autocratic. On the basis of this the following hypothesis is derived:  
 
H12: A poor institutional environment amplifies the negative economic effects of financial 
crises on growth. 
 
 
2.5 Political instability and growth 
By way of introduction, a casual comparison may serve to illustrate the relationship between 
political instability and growth. From 1960 to 1998, Botswana’s economy grew at 5.8 percent 
per year, while Zaire’s economy grew at a negative rate of 2.9 percent (Feng 2003:28). 
Correspondingly, the political climate in Zaire during this period was very turbulent, counting 
eleven riots, eight government crises, one coup d’état, twelve revolutions, and at least three 
assassinations of central politicians. In the same period Botswana experienced one 
governmental crisis (Banks 1999 in Feng 2003:29). Whether this observed relationship is a 
general one has been studied intensively and is central to the goal of this thesis. 
 
The example above connects two phenomena of great interest to both economist and political 
scientists. Campos and Nugent (2002) identifies several economic variables allegedly affected 
by political instability in the literature (Figure 2), one of which is growth. Levine and Renelt 
(1992) identified over 50 variables that have been found to be significantly correlated with 
growth. A decade later, Sala-I-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) compiled a list of 67 
variables, while Durlauf et al. (2004) listed an amazing 145 regressors. The complexity of the 
growth literature demands a complex theoretical basis and thorough investigation of the 
causal patters being studied. Here, I focus on those studies examining the relationship 
between political instability, growth and investment, and also draw upon this literature for 
identifying other mitigating factors of explanation.  
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Figure 2: Studies employing political instability as explanatory variable 
 
 
 
One of the more accepted consensuses in the growth literature is that physical capital, human 
capital and technology constitute proximate causes of growth. Correlations from cross-
country analysis show that these factors matter and by increasing them one should be able to 
increase growth. However, there are fundamental reasons why these proximate causes vary to 
a large degree across countries. These fundamental causes are central to understanding why 
some countries fail, like Zaire, or succeed, like Botswana, in stimulating the proximate factors 
leading to growth. According to Acemoglu (2009:20), the fundamentals concern “the roles of 
policies, institutions, culture, and exogenous environmental factors.” Clearly, political 
instability is one such fundamental factor.  
 
Previous studies 
The relationship between political instability and growth has been thoroughly investigated and 
many empirical findings in the literature have been quite consistent: political instability is 
detrimental for economic growth (Barro 1991; Levine and Renelt 1992; Barro and Lee 1994; 
Mauro 1995; Alesina et al. 1996; Alesina and Perotti 1996; Perotti 1996; Ades and Chua 
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1995) 
Seigniorage (Cukierman 
et al. 1992) 
Budget deficits (Roubini 
1991) 
Growth (Barro 1991; 
Alesina et al. 1996; Ades and 
Chua 1997) 
Exchange rate regime 
(Collins 1996) 
Aggregate investment 
(Özler and Rodrik 1992) 
External debt (Özler and 
Tabellini 1991) 
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1997; Asteriou and Price 2001; Feng 2003). Other studies, however, do not find such 
evidence (Londregan and Poole 1990; Campos and Nugent 2002, 2003). 
 
Campos and Nugent (2002:159) stress the two predominant views of political instability in the 
growth literature, where the first approach emphasize regular and irregular government 
changes and the second focus on unrest due to socio-political factors (revolutions, coups 
d’état, civil wars and political assassinations). According to Mankiw (1995:302), the latter 
view of political instability has proven to have a robust negative effect on growth in the 
literature. Persson and Tabellini (1999) concluded similarly that “more frequent regime 
changes, or political unrest and violence, is significantly and negatively correlated with 
growth in cross-country data”. 
 
Interestingly, two of the most sited studies in this field show opposite results applying the 
same method of analysis. Alesina et al. (1996) results show a high incidence of government 
collapses in countries with low growth. Londregan and Poole (1990), on the other hand, show 
that low economic growth increases political instability. They do not find evidence that 
instability reduce growth, which leads them to conclude that poverty spawns coups, but coups 
do not have economic effects. A common finding, however, is that political instability is 
persistent. Alesina et al. (1996:190) comment that recent government changes increases the 
probability of future collapses. Londregan and Poole (1990:152) more specifically states that 
coups have political aftereffects, dramatically increasing the likelihood of another coup for up 
to six years. Both these studies employ a simultaneous equations framework to explore the 
joint endogeneity of government change and growth. Unlike Londregan and Poole (1990), 
however, Alesina et al. (1996) do not focus solely on coups, but include a broader definition 
of government change. The latter study also control for a number of economic factors.  
 
Several studies also show that political instability is negatively associated with investment 
rates (Barro 1991; Levine and Renelt 1992; Veneris and Gupta 1986). Levine and Renelt 
(1992:958) observe that “countries that experience a high number of revolutions and coups 
tend to be the same countries that invest less of their resources domestically than countries 
with stable political environments.” Campos and Nugent (2003) found the quite opposite 
result: a robust positive relationship between socio-political instability and investment. When 
they examine the direct and indirect effect of socio-political instability on both investment and 
growth they find that the “direct (negative) effect of socio-political instability on growth 
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counterbalances the positive indirect effect of socio-political instability on growth (through 
investment)” (Campos and Nugent 2003:542). This is in line with the result from Campos and 
Nugent (2002) indicating no relationship between socio-political instability and long-term 
growth. Svensson (1998:1332) find that measures of political instability (executive instability 
and socio-political unrest) have no significant effect on investment when he controls for 
protection of property rights, proxied by the institutional quality. This leads him to suggest 
that the effect of political instability on investment runs through the quality of property rights. 
 
Another directly related area of study has been that of income inequalities effect on growth or 
investment through their effect on political instability (Alesina and Perotti 1996; Perotti 1996; 
Persson and Tabellini 1994; Alesina and Rodrik 1994, 1993). By fueling social discontent and 
unrest, Alesina and Perotti (1996) find that income inequality increase the probability of 
coups, revolutions and mass violence thereby reducing growth. In other related lines of 
research, Özler and Tabellini (1991) find that higher political instability leads to increased 
external debt in developing countries; while Cukierman et al. (1992) show that more political 
instability correlates positively with inflation.  
 
Feng (2003:321) critiques several studies for making no distinction between regime change 
and government change (see Alesina et al. 1996; Cukierman et al. 1992). The definitions 
which emphasize the multidimensionality of political instability makes this distinction clear 
(Sanders 1981, Jong-A-Pin 2010). According to Feng (2003:322), Sanders results imply that a 
study of political instability and growth will be theoretically meaningless and may lead to 
confusing results unless political instability is differentiated: “major political instability (such 
as a successful coup d’état) or minor political instability (such as a government change 
involving the same party) will have different consequences for growth.”  
 
Jong-A-Pin (2009:26) finds support for two of the earlier mentioned dimensions of political 
instability affecting economic growth. Instability of the political regime has a negative impact 
on economic growth. The instability of the political regime is in Jong-A-Pin’s view the 
concept that comes closest when referring to the uncertainty of investors regarding property 
rights. The second finding is perhaps more surprising as more instability within the regime is 
found to be good for economic growth. Darby, Li and Muscatelli (2004) finds the opposing 
result, arguing that political instability within governments can reduce the probability of re-
election, leading to lower public investment and therefore lower growth rates. This view 
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emphasizes government myopia, or short-sightedness that leads forward-looking governments 
away from long-term policies because of uncertain re-election prospects (Darby et al. 
2004:154). In support of his finding, Jong-A-Pin refers to Besley, Persson and Sturm (2005) 
who argue that lack of political competition may stifle economic performance. More political 
competition within the regime is therefore good for economic growth as incompetent 
incumbents can be held accountable.  
 
If financial crisis cause political instability within a regime, then this result might indicate that 
the long-term effect on growth due to crisis can be positive, lending support to the moral 
hazard hypothesis and the positive economic effects of forced reform. Remember Cavallo and 
Cavallo (2010) advised against this policy view as their study showed a consistent negative 
effect of crises on growth. Also, this result indicates that a multidimensional approach may be 
most suitable to explain the variation through which political instability affects growth. 
Because, it seems, there are different effects of the different dimensions of instability in 
different contexts. 
 
Table 2 gives an extensive overview of the central empirical findings in the field. Of the 22 
empirical studies surveyed, only nine display a consistent and significant negative effect on 
growth or investment. The other studies’ findings are either insignificant, show ambiguous 
results, conflicting directions of the effect of political instability, or they actually display 
positive effects of instability on growth or investment. Interestingly, of the nine studies 
showing negative results, seven apply a cross-sectional framework and two are time-series. 
No study applying a panel data structure has found a consistent negative and significant effect 
of political instability on growth or investment. The methodological review (section 2.6) will 
discuss these features more specifically. Next, I describe the theoretical background of the 
relationship between political instability and growth. 
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The theory behind the correlation 
There are many theoretical arguments for why political instability affects growth. Two of the 
most common in the literature argue that: (1) Political instability increases policy uncertainty 
affecting incentives of economic agents and therefore growth (Alesina et al 1996). (2) 
Political instability has adverse influences on property rights thereby affecting growth (Barro 
1991). Ades and Chua (1997:280) emphasize a more direct and immediate effect of political 
instability. As a result of “major institutional disruptions and most civil wars” we see 
emigration of the most qualified labor force, and destruction of infrastructure necessary for 
production and trade. Another channel through which growth is affected by political 
instability is due to government myopia. Politicians in an instable regime may implement 
shortsighted policies that benefit themselves or certain groups.  
 
According to Carmignani (2003:1), what is common for the two frequently applied 
dimensions of political instability is that all these possible events generate uncertainty. An 
event that causes uncertainty about the stability of institutions and policymakers will in turn 
create uncertainty regarding the future course of economic policies, the security of property 
rights, the productivity of capital inputs and financial flows. Private investors observing this 
uncertainty may change their incentives to invest. Through fueling social discontent and 
unrest, the probability of coups, revolutions and mass violence increase as a consequence of 
increased policy uncertainty and threats to property rights (Alesina and Perotti 1996). This has 
a negative effect on investment and growth.  
 
Feng (2001) highlight a twofold effect as both consumers and investors react to a political 
unstable situation. “Economic growth is sustained through savings and investment. When a 
political regime is unstable, consumers decrease saving and increase consumption since their 
savings may become worthless” (Feng 2001:273). Investors in the same situation will 
decrease investment in fixed capital stocks and change their portfolios to more liquid and 
portable assets. This means that political instability decrease both the supply of investment 
capital by savers, and the demand for capital by investors. Political instability also has the 
potential effect of increasing unemployment thereby also reducing the pool of savings (ibid). 
 
Because political instability creates uncertainty, the risk of capital loss increases. This can 
change the incentives to save and invest leading investors to become more reluctant towards 
economic initiatives. Feng (2003:21) remark that: “evaluating the political environment is an 
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essential part of an investor’s reasoning process when he makes a decision regarding 
investment and consumption.” The possibility of government change may lower conditions 
for investment no matter if it is a change toward a more investment friendly regime or the 
opposite. Feng (2003:24) explains this as a result of investors being risk-averse. Investors 
appreciate a consistent public policy. If a future change in government implies an 
improvement for investment conditions, investors hold investments until then. If the future 
change implies an increase in the cost of investment, investors also holds investments. This 
means that expectations of unrest and instability, not only actual change, can affect investor’s 
decisions. 
 
Property rights are enforced by the state through the legal system. Svensson (1998:1318) 
states that: “Poorly enforced property rights create a wedge between the marginal product of 
capital and the rate of return that can be privately appropriated by investors.” If the 
enforcement of property rights determines incentives to invest, then investments in legal 
infrastructure are central for increasing investment and growth. Svensson (ibid) argue that 
political instability and polarization make low investment in legal infrastructure a rational 
choice for decision makers maximizing their individual welfare. The implication of this being 
that because governments in politically unstable environments tend to spend little on legal 
infrastructure, this results in lower domestic investment (Svensson 1998:1337).  
 
Alesina and Perotti (1996:1214) argue that political instability affects growth through three 
main channels: 
 
1. By increasing the level of taxation. 
2. Because social unrest can disrupt productive activities thereby creating a fall in the 
productivity of labor and capital. 
3. Through the fact that political instability increases uncertainty “inducing investors to 
postpone projects, invest abroad (…), or simply consume more.” 
 
If politicians become targets, due to social unrest, violence or increased probability of coups, 
then the reputation mechanisms that would normally prevent politicians from raising taxes, 
especially on capital, will no longer be present. Political instability can therefore change 
politicians’ incentives to tax. Investors observing high political instability expect higher taxes 
and therefore hold investments (Alesina and Perotti 1996:1206). This is one form of 
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government myopia which can be induced by political instability. Carmignani (2003:2) also 
mention “increasing government consumption for compensational purposes, reducing 
investments in the legal system, delaying (…) structural reforms and reneging on previously 
made commitments” as possible myopic outcomes.  
 
Campos and Nugent (2003) finds a positive long-run relationship between socio-political 
instability and investment. Some contributions from the investment literature gives a 
theoretical explanation for this result, highlighting irreversibility and the conditions under 
which uncertainty can have a positive effect on investment (Campos and Nugent 2003:533-
534). Abel and Eberly (1999) investigate the effect of irreversibility and uncertainty on long-
run investment. The logic of irreversibility and uncertainty can be explained in the following 
manner: If a firm anticipates that an investment will become irreversible in the future, they are 
more reluctant to invest today. This fear of the future being tied is called the irreversibility 
constraint. When investment is irreversible, “the optimal investment policy is to purchase 
capital only as needed to prevent the marginal revenue product of capital from rising above an 
optimally derived hurdle” (Abel and Eberly 1999:340). Irreversibility increases the hurdle for 
investments to be profitable. Since firms cannot disinvest when investment is irreversible, 
they apply a higher user cost of capital to current investments (Abel and Eberly 1999:364). 
The long-run investment effect of this, according to Abel and Eberly, is that “expected capital 
stock may be higher or lower under irreversibility than under reversibility” (ibid). 
 
Three explanations for their result are suggested by Campos and Nugent (2003:533-534) in a 
situation where socio-political instability is causing uncertainty and the possibility of inability 
to disinvest: 
 
i:  Uncertainty in the form of socio-political instability delays investment. 
ii:  Socio-political instability destroys at least partly the capital stock, causing a big 
increase in replacement investment. 
iii:  Socio-political instability causes changes in government and government policy that 
are beneficial in the long run. 
 
The possibility that political instability can have positive long-run effects on investments 
needs to be taken under consideration. Although, we remember that Campos and Nugent 
(2003) found the negative effects of instability on growth to be counterbalanced by the long-
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run effects of investments. Therefore, what growth-pattern to expect under conditions of 
uncertainty is ambiguous at best. 
 
Hypothesizing the effect of political instability on growth 
According to Kong (2007), there has been little explanation in models of political instability 
and growth, on the underlying mechanisms of how these processes really affect the growth 
trajectory. He refers to the indexation procedures that are very often used as an “add-all-in-
and-stir” recipe for explaining growth. Although Kong may be correct in his accusation of the 
lack of research on underlying mechanisms, the reason for “all-in” recipes in researching 
political instability is that anything less would not represent the many dimensions of the 
concept. On the other hand, specifically controlling for all these mechanisms in quantitative 
models would lead to very large models and probably many difficult issues with regard to all 
the data that would be necessary. The effect of political instability is therefore hypothesized to 
affect growth both directly and through different mechanisms: 
 
Figure 3: The mechanisms of political instability and growth 4 
 
 
 
2.6 Methodological review 
Several methodological approaches have been applied to study the effect of political 
instability on economic growth quantitatively. Table 2 also provides an overview of the 
methodological approaches used by studies in this field. We observe that cross-section studies 
have been most common, but that panel-studies and time-series are also applied. In addition, 
several authors use techniques and estimators to account for endogeneity, joint simultaneity 
                                                 
4
 The effect of political instability through uncertainty could be hypothesized to affect growth both negatively 
and positively through delayed investment, replacement investment and beneficial changes in policy, based on 
the explanation of Campos and Nugent (2003). For simplicity, and because investment is not my main variable 
of interest, I choose only the above mentioned approximation. 
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and to test the direction of causality (Granger-causality).  The purpose of examining the past 
methodological approaches is to evaluate what model and estimation procedure is most 
appropriate.  
 
The “stylized fact” status of the instability-growth relationship has increasingly come under 
critique (Campos and Nugent 2002; Carmignani 2003; De Haan 2007; Jong-A-Pin 2009). De 
Haan (2007) identifies several potential pitfalls: the outcome-sensitivity of the models to 
specification, sample heterogeneity, the problem of measuring political instability, and how to 
treat the time dimension. In short, the critiques are mostly methodological. The methodology 
applied in the studies that generated this “stylized fact” view of the relationship a decade ago 
was not adequate. The application of averaged cross-sections leaves limited room for the 
treatment of estimation bias due to parameter heterogeneity, omitted variables and the joint 
endogeneity of growth and instability (Carmignani 2003:23-24). Furthermore, the choice of 
regressors should be theory-driven, not inductively selected for the purpose of high statistical 
fitness as seem to be the case with many economic variables (Carmignani 2003:25; De Haan 
2007:283). After surveying the literature on political instability and growth, Carmignani 
(2003:31) finds that the early contributions show evidence of a strong negative relationship 
between instability and growth. As we can see from Table 2, common for many of the early 
studies is that they do not tackle the problem of joint endogeneity explicitly, and among those 
who have, the results are not consistent. 
 
Cross-section and panel modeling 
Feng (2003:66) analyzes cross-section data instead of time-series data because of his focus on 
the secular trend of economic growth and not “dynamic change, transitional crises, or external 
shocks.” This methodological approach uses cross-country data averaged over a long period 
of time and allows him to focus on the long-run trends of economic performance. One critique 
of the opposite, put forward by Barro (1997), states that in the short-run dynamic approach the 
relationship between growth and its determinants may well become poorly specified because 
of business cycles: “precise timing between growth and its determinants is not well specified 
at the high frequencies characteristics of ‘business cycles’”(Barro 1997:15). An advantage of 
pure cross-sections is that averaging out variables minimizes the problem of missing 
observations, a predicament that is well known especially with respect to developing 
countries. However, in cross-section models the problem of parameter heterogeneity is likely 
to occur when a large number of countries with different social, political, cultural and 
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institutional structures are assumed to be identical (Carmignani 2003:23). Asteriou and Price 
(2001:384) comment that while cross-sections may offer consistent estimators for long-run 
growth effects, they fail to capture information of particular events and how they influence 
growth. Another problem with cross-section studies is omitting country-specific fixed effects, 
thereby boosting the effect of other explanatory variables acting as proxies for unobserved 
phenomena (Benhabib and Spiegel 1997:3). When included independent variables are 
correlated with excluded variables we get omitted variable bias with ordinary or generalized 
least squares estimation techniques. Testing if assumptions hold and whether or not bias is 
present is essential when applying quantitative techniques.  
 
Panel analysis may better cope with some of the above mentioned problems. Using panel data 
we have the advantage of being able to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Since panel data 
employs both cross-section and time-series the total number of degrees of freedom increase 
compared to pure time-series and cross-sections. This presents possibilities for applying 
robust estimation techniques, including sub-samples or group dummies, thereby addressing 
i.e. parameter heterogeneity (Carmignani 2003:23). Feng (2003:67) argue that including time-
series are advantageous when studying the dynamic change relationship between political and 
economic development. Panel models are also able to take this argument one step further. 
Dynamic panel models including a lagged dependent variable as a regressor may be better 
able to model the dynamics of change (see i.e Jong-A-Pin 2009; Benhabib and Spiegel 1997). 
This technique is especially suitable if we have a theoretical expectation that earlier values of 
the dependent variable have a direct causal effect on succeeding values. It seems likely that 
the growth in income in one period has consequences for investment decisions, distribution of 
expenditures, etc. in the period that follows. Therefore, economic growth in period t may have 
a causal effect on growth in period t+1. The dynamic model also provides a solution to 
problems of autocorrelation, which is a common problem in time-series and panel structures, 
since temporal dependence is explained by the earlier values of the dependent variable (Finkel 
2008:487). Islam (1995) reformulates the growth convergence equation of Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1992) into a dynamic panel data model with country specific effects. Taking the 
production function as the starting point he argues that it is only natural that the production 
function will differ across countries. An effect that cannot be adequately isolated using cross-
section methodology. Islam (1995:1128) further argues that “From growth theory’s point of 
view, the panel approach allows us to isolate the effect of “capital deepening” on the one hand 
and technological and institutional differences on the other, in the process of convergence.” 
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Panel models are by no means the solution to all problems; they in fact create some new ones. 
Feng (2003:66) comment that the use of panel fixed effects estimation (within-country 
variation) also can be problematic if it is accomplished by first differentiating, due to potential 
loss of data. Another problem with a fixed effects panel model is that time-invariable factors 
are factored out of the equation, which makes us unable to include regressors that do not vary 
over time. 
 
The problem of joint endogeneity 
The relationship between political and economic development are complex. If political 
instability and economic growth are mutually related then results may be biased. This creates 
the methodological challenge of simultaneity. If poor growth can cause political instability 
this needs to be accounted for in the quantitative model. The substantive problem that creates 
the statistical dilemma is accurately described in Alesina and Perotti (1994:359) as a vicious 
circle trapping poor countries: “They are unstable because they do not manage to become 
rich, and they do not manage to become rich because they are politically unstable.” 
 
Some studies simply assume that political instability is an exogenous variable: “Political 
stability also reflect other, permanent, or slowly changing features of a political system. 
Political institutions, culture, tradition, underlying conflicts, cleavage of population into 
organized groups, and the extent of political participation and the involvement of the citizens 
are all semipermanent features of a country that affects its stability” (Cukierman et al. 
1992:550). Miljkovic and Rimal (2007) dismiss most technical solutions and simply argue 
that their “array” of regression results will enable them to make credible conclusions without 
statistically controlling for simultaneous effects. Other studies more specifically treat the 
problem of simultaneity. Londregan and Poole (1990) and Alesina et al. (1996) adapt 
simultaneous equation models that allow both growth and political instability to be treated as 
endogenous variables. Londregan and Poole (1990) results indicate that the direction of 
causality runs from growth to coups, while Alesina et al. (1996) results suggest that the 
direction of causality runs from political instability to growth. These diverging outcomes have 
led later studies to focus more precisely on estimating the direction of causality and possible 
endogeneity.  
 
Asteriou and Price (2001:390) perform Granger causality tests to determine the direction of 
causality in their study of the United Kingdom. They find that political instability mainly 
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affects growth, and not vice versa. Specifically, strikes, terrorist incidents and regime change 
causes growth, while growth only causes changes in regime. Campos and Nugent (2002) find 
no evidence that political instability Granger-causes economic growth, nor do they find 
evidence for the opposite direction of causality. However, their sensitivity analysis reveals a 
contemporaneous negative relationship and the Sub-Saharan sample are suggested to be the 
driving force causing this negative connection (Campos and Nugent 2002:158). In a 
subsequent study of the direction of causality between political instability and investment, 
Campos and Nugent (2003) find a robust positive causal relationship between instability and 
investment. Jong-A-Pin (2009:17) finds both a contemporaneous relation and a Granger 
causal relationship running from instability of the political regime to growth. He also finds 
some evidence of a two-way causality between growth and instability within countries, and 
that growth has a causal effect on political violence. These studies use a dynamic panel 
framework, in which they apply the concept of Granger causality (Granger 1987). Jong-A-Pin 
(2009:21) explains this approach as “evaluating the lagged impact of political instability on 
current values of economic growth, whilst controlling for the lagged effect of economic 
growth (and other explanatory variables)”.  
 
Other techniques are also commonly found. The instrumental variable approach uses a set of 
additional variables that are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable to generate a 
transformed model that can be consistently estimated (Carmignani 2003:29). The instruments 
cannot, however, be correlated with the regressions error-term, and demands testing the 
instruments appropriateness. Finding good instruments is therefore a challenging task. As 
Durlauf et al. (2004:117) state: “the belief that it is easy to identify valid instrumental 
variables in the growth context is deeply mistaken.” However, panel data may also simplify 
the search for instruments. Some panel estimation techniques apply lagged versions of the 
endogenous explanatory variable as instruments, thereby escaping the troublesome process of 
finding other instruments. Benhabib and Spiegel (1997) and Jong-A-Pin (2009) choose a 
generalized method of moment’s framework where the potential endogeneity of political 
instability is instrumented by lagged variables of political instability. Less formal ways of 
modeling endogeneity are also applied. Giving explanatory variables that are thought to be 
endogenous a lag is a way of ensuring the direction of causality runs in the right direction 
(Feng 2003:68). However, this straightforward technique has the consequence of stealing 
degrees of freedom, and so do the approach using lagged explanatory variable as instrument. 
Yet another possibility is to use measures of explanatory variables at the start of the sample 
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period (Svensson 1998). For example, the institutional context at the beginning of the sample 
period could be used to explain the subsequent development in economic growth. 
 
How important is the potential problem of endogeneity? If it is true that political instability 
lowers growth, but growth feeds back into instability, then the estimates will conflate the 
effects and results are inconsistent estimates of the causal effect (Durlauf et al. 2004:116). 
Many studies have explored this endogeneity without arriving at a consistent answer to the 
problem. According to Mankiw (1995) and Wacziarg (2002) it is necessary to accept that 
reliable causal statements in the growth literature are almost impossible to make. This, 
however, does not mean that simultaneity can be overlooked due to the statistical problem it 
creates. The question is rather how one chooses to address the problem. 
 
Model specification 
What is the proper model specification in growth studies? The neoclassical growth theories 
argue that the engine of growth is capital accumulation, while the endogenous growth theories 
emphasize human capital and differences in technology as the explanation of differences in 
growth convergence (Kong 2007:11). This has been further explored by the political economy 
literature emphasizing the effect of political and institutional variables in explaining cross-
country variation in economic growth. Benhabib and Spiegel (1997:1) suggest that such 
ancillary variables influence growth primarily through their impact on factor accumulation. 
As mentioned earlier, the proximate causes of growth are influenced strongly by fundamental 
factors that differ widely across countries and possibly over time. Benhabib and Spiegel 
(1997) make as a starting point a “base-model” accounting for technological progress and 
factor accumulation. Then it is asked whether ancillary variables affect growth directly or 
through factor accumulation, and if these variables explain departures of growth from the base 
values. Jong-A-Pin’s (2009) “baseline” model, for example, bases the selection of exploratory 
variables on the basic Solow framework. His vector of economic variables therefore consists 
of the initial investment/GDP ratio, the level of initial secondary school enrollment and the 
initial population growth. These approaches are very common and intuitively appealing. The 
inclusion of initial variable values has the purpose of testing the convergence hypothesis in 
economic growth theories. Jong-A-Pin then goes on to test the sensitivity of his baseline 
results by including a set of alternative variables indicated by the instability-growth literature 
to be of significance. In this thesis, both financial crises and political instability are 
hypothesized to be potential causes of departures from the growth base values. The 
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parsimonious economic model based on the central convergence hypothesis in the growth 
literature seems to be a natural starting point to study departures from growth curves. It makes 
the study comparable to other studies applying the same basic setup, and it is well founded in 
economic theory (for details, see i.e. Islam 1995; Durlauf et al. 2004).  
 
Causality and context 
As previously mentioned, there has been found diverging effects of different dimensions of 
political instability in different contexts. For example, Jong-A-Pin (2009) finds that instability 
of regimes are growth-negative, while instability within are growth-positive. Campos and 
Nugent (2003) find a long-term positive effect of instability on investment and a short-term 
negative effect. Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya’s (2005) results show that measures of political 
violence typically are growth-negative, while government and social instability are 
insignificant. In addition, effects are found to be conditioned upon income-levels. Generally, 
results of quantitative approaches in the instability-growth literature have diverging results, 
possibly due to parameter heterogeneity, simultaneity, misspecification and errors of 
measurement. How do we establish causality in a field of study facing these challenges?  
 
Falleti and Lynch (2009:1143) emphasize that causal explanations must be contextually 
bounded. To draw causation, one must understand the relationship between context and 
mechanisms. Measurements and indicators are observed within different contexts, which need 
to be accounted for. This relates to the problem of parameter heterogeneity in quantitative 
studies. If the units of analysis “are not equivalent in ways that are likely to be causally 
relevant” (Falleti and Lynch 2009:1144), then how do we produce valid causal inference? 
One development within quantitative approaches, emphasized by Falleti and Lynch (2009), 
are multilevel studies. These models examine units at two or more levels of society (Grønmo 
2004:389). By using data from several levels we get a more nuanced picture of the 
phenomena we are studying. If we ask how the relationship on one level is conditioned by 
relations on another level, then the latter level thereby constitutes the contextual reference, or 
prerequisite conditions, for the first (ibid). It seems likely to assume a different impact of 
financial crises in developed and developing countries, both with regards to instability and 
growth. It would also be likely to expect the nature of phenomena of political instability to be 
different in democracies and autocracies, which in turn would affect the growth pattern, or the 
departure from the growth pattern, differently. Specifically, the role of institutions in 
comparative political economy is central to explain context. Solow (1986) makes the 
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observation that “more often than not we fail to take institutional differences seriously. One 
model is supposed to apply everywhere and always” (sited in Western 1998:1235). Such 
differences, or heterogeneity across countries, are often modeled simply by including control 
variables to “stratify the analysis to achieve causal comparability” (Falleti and Lynch 
2009:1144), or by introducing interaction terms in regressions to make effects of one variable 
on the dependent conditional upon a third.  
 
If it is necessary to substantively account for causal heterogeneity, Steenbergen and Jones 
(2002) recommend multilevel analysis as the preferred procedure. Given, of course, that 
multilevel data structures exist within the framework one is examining. On the other hand, if 
it is enough to statistically control for causal heterogeneity, then a panel framework may be 
satisfactory. The Least Square Dummy Variable or fixed effects approaches accomplish this 
by absorbing the contextual or subgroup differences. However, these models do not explain 
the difference, they only account for them. The interactive, random-error or random effects 
models are able to include subgroup predictors and thus to substantively account for causal 
heterogeneity. By using a random effects model it is also possible to separate effects within 
countries over time, from the average effect between countries. This possibility of explicitly 
modeling heterogeneity between countries is emphasized in the next section. 
 
 
2.7 Chapter summary 
Section 2.1 discussed financial crises. It was argued that the measure of banking crises is 
suitable since it captures both internal and external forms of financial distress. Cavallo and 
Cavallo (2010) also find this proxy of financial crises to correlate most with other crisis 
measures. Section 2.2 described a development from one- and two-dimensional, to a 
multidimensional view of political instability. Feng (2003) conceived political instability as 
merely government change, Alesina and Perotti (1996) emphasized both regime-related 
instability and instability induced by the civil-society, while Jong-A-Pin (2009) developed a 
multidimensional framework where political violence, mass civil protest, instability within 
regimes, and instability of regimes was found to be the central dimensions. Because of its 
nature as qualitative phenomena, political instability may be difficult to measure. Therefore, 
several authors employ factor analysis or principal component analysis to capture several 
relevant phenomena.  
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Section 2.3 presented the theoretical expectations and previous empirical findings on the 
determinants of political instability. I have hypothesized that financial crises, inflation, 
economic and social inequality, and regional instability to have a positive effect on political 
instability. Income growth, trade openness, government spending and democratic institutions 
are expected to have a negative effect on political instability. In addition, the effect of 
financial crises may be dependent on the level of income and therefore have a positive effect 
on political instability since financial crises are thought to lower income.  
 
Section 2.4 discussed the connection between financial crises and economic growth. The 
central argument is that crises are destabilizing for central macroeconomic variables and 
therefore negative for growth. However, some argue that the long-term effect may be positive 
if crises comes as a product of financial liberalization, or because reform and learning-
processes take place (Drazen 2000; Rancière et al. 2008). According to Cavallo and Cavallo 
(2010) financial crises are critical junctures and the long-term effect depends on the 
institutional set-up. Therefore, the last hypothesis states that a politically unstable 
environment may amplify the negative effects of crises on growth. 
 
Section 2.5 identified the theoretical background for how political instability may affect 
growth, and gave a rigorous overview of the many contrasting findings. Political instability 
may increase uncertainty and have adverse influences on property rights (Barro 1991; Alesina 
et al. 1996). Furthermore, political instability may lead to emigration and destruction of 
infrastructure (Ades and Chua 1997). Myopic policies may also be the product of political 
instability, thereby increasing the level of taxation, or simply benefiting the sitting regime 
(Alesina and Perotti 1996). These are the main mechanisms through which political instability 
are thought to affect growth. On the other hand, Campos and Nugent (2003) also believe that 
delayed investment, replacement investment and changes in government or policies may 
explain their finding of a positive effect of instability on long-run growth and investment. 
 
Section 2.6 gave a methodological review of past studies of instability and growth. Here, 
some pro’s and con’s regarding both cross-sections and panel data models were presented, it 
became clear that the joint endogeneity of instability and growth need to be treated to avoid 
simultaneity bias, and the part on causality and context suggested that panel data models may 
help us to control for causal heterogeneity. 
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3.0 Method 
This thesis has two dependent variables. First, it will be examined if financial crises create 
political instability. Second, it will be examined how political instability affects economic 
growth in general and with financial crises entering as critical junctures. The method of 
choice for investigating both these relationships is panel data analysis. More specifically, I 
will apply the benefits of within- and between-analysis. Such models are often referred to as 
Random Coefficient Models or Mixed Models in the multilevel literature. The features of this 
method will be explained shortly. Thereafter, it is argued for the choice of estimation 
technique before some problems with longitudinal data, econometrical challenges, and 
assumptions in panel models are discussed. 
 
3.1 Panel data models 
Since panel data contains repeated observations on the same units, this allows for more 
complicated and realistic models than cross-sections or time-series (Verbeek 2008:355). In 
these analyses, the countries that are units of observations (i = 1, 2, 3…N) are followed over a 
period of years (t = 1, 2, 3, …T). The panel data structure gives several advantages. First of 
all, including a time dimension lets us estimate the impact of the variables at several points in 
time. This minimizes the risk that cause preceded effect, we can be surer that the variables are 
correlated at more than one random period in time, and therefore that the relationship is not 
spurious (Finkel 2001:476). A panel design does not only allow for comparison between, or 
across, systems over time, but also within one system over time. Furthermore, since N is 
multiplied by T we get a higher number of total observations, which is positive both in terms 
of degrees of freedom for modeling purposes, and the overall robustness of the research 
design. Data covering two dimensions, time and space, are more informative, have more 
variability and less collinearity among the included variables (Batalgi 2008:7). However, the 
major reason why many scientists apply panel data models is the possibility of controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity. This point deserves a closer inspection and a general static panel 
data model can be used as a basis of explanation. 
 
(1)  Yit = β0 + β X'it + εit   εit = (αi + µit) 
 
In equation (1), the dependent variable Yit is explained by a vector X'it of explanatory 
variables, β is the panel data estimator, εit contains a stochastic error term µit with normal 
properties, and a unit-specific unobserved effect αi that is constant over time. When analyzing 
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panel data we cannot assume that the observations are independently distributed across time 
(Wooldridge 2009:445). The error term will vary over time and units capturing all 
unobservable factors that affect the dependent variable. Since the same units are observed 
repeatedly, it is an unrealistic assumption that the error terms in different periods are 
uncorrelated (Verbeek 2008:356). However, precisely since the unobserved factors are 
present over time, this variation can be estimated and exploited. One main difference between 
different panel data estimators is how this unit-specific unobserved effect is treated.  
 
Fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) 
One may obtain FE estimates (2) by including unit-specific intercept terms in the regression 
equation, and excluding the overall intercept. This is referred to as the Least Square Dummy 
Variable approach, where the intercepts capture all the factors that are unit-specific, or 
country-specific. We obtain the same results without having to include N-1 numbers of 
dummy variables by calculating X'it as deviations from individual means. This is often 
referred to as the within-estimator because the transformation of observations into deviation 
from individual means, leave the within-variation for every group of observations and 
excludes the constant unit-specific effect, as shown in (2.1) and (2.2). This becomes possible 
by exploiting the time variation in the variables. In RE models (3), the unit-specific effect αi 
is included as a stochastic variable, assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
over units. This is often referred to as the error-components model since its error-term 
includes two variables. 
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The main advantage of panel data involves reducing identification problems “in the presence 
of endogenous regressors or measurement error, robustness to omitted variables and the 
identification of individual dynamics” (Verbeek 2008:358). The unit-specific effect is often 
interpreted as representing omitted variables, and therefore panel data has the advantage of 
being able to statistically avoid omitted variable bias that may arise due to characteristics that 
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are specific for a particular unit or country in this case. This is a valued property since one 
important critique against quantitative models is that unit heterogeneity cannot be “assumed 
away”, and may make results non-comparable across continents, regions or even countries. 
Petersen (2004:342) comments that the two estimators basically reports on two different 
aspects of the data. Where FE answers the research question with “within-individual 
changes”, the RE approaches also utilizes “differences between individuals”. So where FE use 
the time variation around the averages within every unit, RE combines the between and within 
variation. Since the RE estimator utilizes more variation than the FE estimator this is 
considered more efficient, on the other hand, the FE estimator is considered more robust to 
bias. Several also argue that the fixed vs. random debate should be softened when T is high, 
because as T → ∞ the βRE will converge towards βFE (Veerbeek 2008:366-367; Petersen 
2004:340). However, when T is small the differences may be substantial.  
 
In panel models, the assumption that explanatory variables are not correlated with the error 
term must still be valid. So that Corr (xit, uit) = 0, for all i, t. Furthermore, the unit-specific 
effects cannot be correlated with the explanatory variables: Corr (xit, αi) = 0, for all i, t. Since 
the complete error term includes εit = (αi + µit) OLS estimates will be consistent (with error in 
inference) as long as E (εit) = 0 and Corr (xit, εit) = 0, but if αi or uit is correlated with xit results 
are also biased. This is solved by transforming the observations into deviations from 
individual means in the FE model.5 The RE model includes this effect and therefore the 
assumption that Corr (αi, xit) = 0, must be satisfied. This strict assumption is normally tested 
with a Hausman test, where the null hypothesis is that αi and xit are uncorrelated (Hausman 
1978). 6  
 
Corr (αi, xit) = 0  –  FE is consistent. RE is consistent and efficient. 
Corr (αi, xit) ≠ 0  –  FE is consistent. RE is inconsistent (biased). 
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)ˆˆ())ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ()ˆˆ( 1 REFEREFEREFE raVraVH ββββββ −−′−= − , H has chi square distribution with k 
degrees of freedom. Hausman basically test whether there is a significant difference between the FE and RE 
estimates. If so, the null hypothesis is unlikely to hold (Verbeek 2008:368). One important reason for such a 
difference is that αi and xit are correlated (Verbeek 2008:369). 
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Because the FE procedure consists of deviations from individual means, this also leads to 
elimination of all constant explanatory variables. This is straightforward to understand: since 
the variables do not vary over time within units, they have no deviation from their mean. 
From this follows another problem with FE models, that all between-variation is excluded. 
This means that although the relationship between y and x is estimated to be positive or 
negative within units, the effect between units may be the opposite (ecological fallacy). FE 
approaches may also have substantially larger standard errors than RE-estimates in many 
cases (Allison 2009:3). Especially when predictors have little variation over time, but large 
variation between units, the FE estimates will be imprecise. Therefore, it is also more likely to 
make type II errors (reporting no effect when there is an effect), when applying the FE 
estimator. 
 
On the other hand, the RE estimator allows for the inclusion of time-constant explanatory 
variables since it also exploits the between-variation.7 However, the inclusion of the unit-
specific effects as stochastic variables assumes that they are indeed randomly drawn from a 
larger population. They are not “one of a kind”, which is often the interpretation of country 
specific effects (Verbeek 2008:367). Allison (2009:23) comments that the choice between FE 
and RE is really a choice between bias and efficiency. RE gives more efficient estimates, but 
is biased if assumptions are wrong. FE is less prone to bias, but less efficient. However, this 
choice may not be an absolute, as is discussed in the next section.  
 
Within- and between-analysis 
When we estimate within-effects (FE), each unit serve as its own control, and thus all unit-
specific explanatory variables are held constant. Once estimates also include between-effects 
(RE), we may have unit- or cluster-level omitted-variable bias, and therefore overestimate the 
true effect of the relationship (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008:114). Since there are many 
potential gains by using RE models, it has been suggested potential solutions to the problem 
that the unit-specific effect may be correlated with explanatory variables and therefore the 
residual. Snijders and Bosker (1999:44) argue that by including the variables group means as 
                                                 
7
 Since RE estimates include αi as a part of the error term, the composite error term εit = (αi + µit) exhibit a special 
form of autocorrelation (Verbeek 2008:364). Consequently, OLS standard errors are incorrect, and therefore RE 
estimates are computed using the more efficient Generalized Least Squares estimator (GLS). It can be shown 
that RE estimates are a matrix weighted average of the between-groups and the FE-estimator: βRE = βbetween + (1 – 
∆) + βFE, where ∆ = βRE - βFE / βbetween - βFE. For details, see Batalgi (2008:17-21) or Verbeek (2008: 364-367). 
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explanatory variable, as seen in equation (4), the correlation between the unit-specific effect 
and the explanatory variable is removed. Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008:115) argue 
similarly, that the assumption that within- and between-effects are identical may easily be 
relaxed by using a model such as (5). Verbeek (2008:359) also point to the fact that panel data 
have the benefit of providing internal instruments. 
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In (5), the deviation estimate of Xit from its unit-mean serve as an instrument variable for Xit 
since it is correlated with Xit, but uncorrelated with the residual (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
2008:115).Within- and between-estimates are also of substantial interest. It is interesting to 
learn if the explanatory variables primarily vary within countries over time, between countries, 
or both within and between countries. For example, Jong-A-Pin (2009:20) revealed that his 
dimensions of political instability varied both within (over time) and between countries.  
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As shown in (4.1), the procedure suggested by Snijders and Bosker (1999) may be applied to 
identify the variables where the between-variation is significant. A significant difference 
within and between countries indicates that the effects should be modeled as in (5.1) in the 
final model. Addressing the problem highlighted by Mundlak (1978), this procedure can be 
applied to all explanatory variables. Thus one would ensure that estimation of all within-
effects are consistent “because the deviations from the cluster means are uncorrelated with the 
cluster means themselves,” uncorrelated with the between-covariates, and the unit-specific 
effect (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008:119). Zorn (2001) advises that while modeling 
within- and between-effects separately might be informative, they serve merely as 
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illustrations if the data truly are clustered, because then each is underspecified without 
inclusion of the other. 
 
Choosing estimation technique 
Because of the potential gains by using an RE model, and the substantial interest in estimating 
within- and between-effects, this procedure is chosen to investigate the questions of interest. 
Applying the model in (5.1) allow inclusion of unit-constant explanatory variables that would 
otherwise have been excluded. However, the RE approach need some justification in the 
growth context.  
 
Islam (1995:1138) argues that FE estimation is most suitable in growth regressions. Since the 
unit-specific effects are thought to consist of technological and institutional differences that 
are unobserved, it is precisely their correlation with economic growth that argues in favor of a 
panel model with fixed effects. Because the RE estimator relies on the assumption that these 
effects are uncorrelated with the exogenous variables in the model, which also correlates with 
growth, the assumption seem unreasonable. Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) argue 
similarly, that since the level of efficiency is unobserved, this will correlate with the level of 
income producing biased estimates. So, one could argue that although the Hausman test 
should indicate that the RE approximation is valid, this should not be taken as evidence that it 
is substantially correct. On the other hand, the application of within- and between-variables 
will impose a within-effect on the estimates while allowing the most efficient estimator to be 
applied. The Hausman test can also be used to verify that the estimation using within- and 
between-variables have the desired effect by comparing the results to a test based on 
estimation with ordinary variables. 
 
In section 2.5 it was argued that there are fundamental reasons why the proximate causes of 
growth vary between countries. A central goal of growth empirics is to explain the differences 
in these growth patterns across countries. What then, can we learn by studying growth within 
countries (FE-approaches), about the variation in the proximate causes across countries? 
Studying differences across countries by excluding the variation between countries may seem 
puzzling. Using the within- and between-analysis I hope to avoid the bias that normally lead 
econometricians to choose FE, while retaining the between-variation, which is of substantial 
interest in growth econometrics. 
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Interaction terms 
To test hypothesis H2A and H12, I need to include interaction terms in the regressions. If the 
effect of a variable X1 on Y is dependent on another variable X2, we say that the effect of X1 
is conditional upon X2. This effect can be modelled as in equation 6 (panel notation is 
dropped for simplicity): 
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Whether the effect of financial crises on political instability is contingent upon income, and 
whether the effect of financial crises on growth is conditional on the political environment, 
can be tested using a model such as (6). If Y is growth, X1 financial crises (β1 < 0) and X2 is 
democracy (β2 > 0), the interpretation of β3 is that when β3 > 0 the negative effect of financial 
crises on growth is lower for higher democracy scores. To avoid multicollinearity and to make 
the interpretation of the interaction term more meaningful, Wooldridge (2009:197) suggest 
centering the variables before making the interaction term. However, as I apply within- and 
between-analysis, this approach is not meaningful because the variables are already 
constructed as means and deviations. Therefore, I follow the procedure in (6) by modeling the 
interaction terms as seen in (7), but examine possible multicollinearity before including the 
interactions. Kromey and Foster-Johnsen (1998) have argued that in the end, it is the 
incapability of the data to distinguish sharply between autonomous effects and interplay 
effects of a variable that leads to high multicollinearity. Because of this, the advice of 
centering variables: “merely shunts the difficulties” (Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis 
2006:166). 
 
Problems with longitudinal data 
According to Verbeek (2008), the drawbacks of using panel data are mainly practical. Panels 
require a lot of data and gathering it may be time consuming and costly. Furthermore, 
different time series from different sources may severely limit the sample period, or force the 
researcher to choose less favored indicators. Additionally, panel data sets often suffer from 
missing observations. An incomplete panel data set where i * t < I * T is called an unbalanced 
panel. Computationally it is unproblematic to estimate unbalanced panels and estimators 
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remain consistent if observations are missing at random, but if observations are missing 
systematically (i.e for a region, level of income etc.) this may lead to estimation bias. It is of 
course also substantially challenging to say whether one is measuring what is intended if data 
central to the analysis is missing. This lack of data may exist due to a variety of reasons. Low 
income countries can typically have missing data due to poor institutional set-ups and lack of 
routines for gathering statistical data. Furthermore, autocratic rulers may have incentives to 
hold back information or show results to be of a more favorable nature, thereby making the 
data less trustworthy. These questions must be dealt with in the process of choosing the most 
valid and reliable data available. 
 
Econometrical challenges and assumptions in panel data models 
 
Simultaneity 
As emphasized in the methodological review, it is central to treat the endogeneity of political 
instability in the growth regression. This is also vital with respect to financial crises, when 
examining the determinants of political instability in the first analysis. Four potential solutions 
were evaluated. First, the analysis could have been performed as simultaneous equations, with 
growth and political instability as dependent variables and each others main explanatory 
variables, and financial crises as a common explanatory variable. Because of the 
operationalization of political instability into four dimensions (see section 4.2), this would be 
very complicated. A second alternative is to use external instruments, but taking the warning 
by Durlauf et al. (2004) about the difficulty of finding good instruments into account, this 
option is ruled out. As a third possibility, the opportunity of using internal instruments was 
evaluated. Jong-A-Pin (2009) employ the system-GMM estimator, as proposed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), where the endogenous explanatory variables 
are instrumented by up to t
-2 lagged versions of themselves. Due to the unbalanced panel used 
in this thesis, and the large loss of data points this technique causes, it is dismissed (see 
section 4.0). The chosen technique is also the simplest. The endogenous variables will be 
lagged by one year, in order to ensure that the direction of causality run in the right direction. 
This alternative provides less loss in degrees of freedom than internal instruments, it is far 
simpler than finding external instruments, and more parsimonious than simultaneous 
equations. 
 
Heterogeneity 
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Kong (2007:21) describes two types of heterogeneity, which commonly occurs in panel 
regressions. The first is heterogeneity across countries, or parameter heterogeneity, which 
occur because different countries are not expected to share common parameters. By including 
specific between-effects, this will specify what variables have significant variation between 
units. The second type is heterogeneity over time within countries, which reflects the episodic 
nature of growth. This is often overcome by averaging growth rates, and is also the approach 
chosen in this thesis (see section 4.1). 
 
Homoskedasticity 
To be homoskedastic, the regression disturbances should display the same variance across 
time and individuals (Batalgi 2008:87). As with pure cross-sections, this may be a problem 
with panel data since different cross-sectional units may be of varying size and therefore have 
different variation. If the residual variance is conditional/dependent upon the value of the 
explanatory variables, then the regression may be influenced by heteroskedasticity. Assuming 
homoskedasticity when heteroskedasticity is present gives consistent, but not efficient 
estimates, and the standard errors will be biased (ibid). 
 
Assumption: Var (µi|X’) = Var (µi) = σ2, i = 1, 2, …, N. 
Treatment: Robust estimation (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) 
 
Panel heteroskedasticity 
So called panel heteroskedasticity may occur if the residual variance across units over time 
varies because of characteristics unique to each unit (Worall 2008:234). When the residual 
variance is not constant over units, or groups of units, then the homoskedasticity assumption 
is violated in a particular manner (Baum 2006:150, 222). In addition, errors may be correlated 
between units at the same time, producing so called contemporaneous correlation. 
 
Assumptions: Corr (µit, µis) = 0, t ≠ s. Corr (µit, µjs) = 0, i ≠ j, for all t, s. 
Treatment: Robust estimation (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) 
 
Serial correlation 
In economic time series, upward trending variables are very common. Serial correlation, or 
autocorrelation, arises because the disturbances capture such trends and become correlated 
across time. Also, unobservable effects affecting the dependent variable, that is captured by 
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the error term, may be persistent over time and thereby generate positive autocorrelation 
(Verbeek 2008:105). Assuming uncorrelated error terms when serial correlation is present 
gives consistent, but not efficient estimates, and the standard errors will be biased (Verbeek 
2008:372). The most common form of serial correlation is a first order autoregressive 
structure (AR(1)) where µt  correlates with, or is dependent on,  µt-1. It is also possible to have 
serial correlation of a higher order (AR(2) etc.). It is possible to account for serial correlation 
by first-differencing the variables thereby accounting for the trend. Dynamic models are also 
able to account for serial correlation because the included lagged dependent variable now 
explains the temporal dependency (Finkel 2008:487; Worall 2008:238). Averaging variables 
over several periods also combats autocorrelation. 
 
Assumption: Corr (µt, µs) = 0 for all t ≠ s.  
Treatment: Robust estimation (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) and averaged variables. 
 
Stationarity 
Variables like GDP growth may display strong non-stationarity (Batalgi 2008:274). A panel is 
stationary when the means, variance and auto-covariance remain constant across all time 
points at different lags (Worall 2008:238). In panels, the dependent variable yit may be 
stationary for country one, but integrated of order one for country two. Such heterogeneity in 
cointegration properties may lead to problems (Verbeek 2008:389). A stationary process 
indicates that the variable is integrated of zero-order, noted as I(0). 
 
Assumption: Xt ~ I(0) 
Treatment: No treatment necessary. All variables were tested using Stata’s command 
‘xtfisher’. No non-stationary processes were detected, which is not surprising given that the 
data is averaged. 
 
Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is the phenomenon of highly correlated independent variables (Pennings et 
al. 2006:162). Presence of multicollinearity may inflate the standard errors of the regression. 
A simple correlation between suspected variables may reveal that they should not be included 
together on the right hand side of the regression equation. However, there is no definitely 
defined value of collinearity over which multicollinearity is a problem. Batalgi (2008:7) argue 
that this problem is smaller with panel data than with only time-series or cross-sections. 
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Although there is disagreement about the appropriateness of formally testing for 
multicollinearity, there exist tests for assessing individual coefficients. One of these is the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), where the VIF-value is the factor by which the variation of 
the coefficient βj is higher because Xj is not uncorrelated with other explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge 2009:99). A cutoff point is often set at VIF > 10 as indicating multicollinearity.  
 
To test for multicollinearity between explanatory variables, suspected variables have been 
examined by simple correlations prior to the analysis. In addition, a VIF-test of the final 
models is performed using Stata’s ‘collin’ command. Results indicate no problems of 
multicollinearity and can be found in appendix table 5. 
 
Normality 
When testing statistic hypothesis it is normal to assume that the residuals have a normal 
distribution. If the residuals have a different distribution, inferences based on the expectations 
of a normal distribution may give rise to problems (Skog 2005:249). As the sample size 
grows, it converges toward the population value (Wooldridge 2009:172). Therefore, problems 
of non-normality are smaller with longitudinal data. Outliers are a potential problem for both 
the assumption of normality and homoskedasticity. One cause of outliers is that the 
relationship is not linear. Transforming the variables could treat this problem (Skog 
2005:249). Another potential solution is dropping the units that lie far from the regression 
line. This, however, may be misleading, since these observations also represent reality (given 
that they are not the product of measurement error). To test for normality, a Shapiro and Wilk 
W-test is conducted using Stata’s ‘swilk’ command. This displays normal distribution. Results 
can be found in appendix table 6. 
 
Linearity 
The basic assumption of most regression models is linearity in parameters. Non-linearity may 
therefore lead to weak estimates of the true effect (Skog 2005:239). Estimating a linear 
relationship when it is in fact quadratic constitute a misspecification of the regression. On the 
other hand, if one searches for non-linearity by including quadratic terms for all variables, 
odds are some will be found. Answering the critique of Carmignani (2003) and De Haan 
(2007), these analyses only include variables (and specifications of these) based on the 
theoretical framework. In addition, logarithmic variables are used when appropriate. 
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3.2 Chapter summary 
The method of choice in this thesis is panel data analysis. The research question will be 
examined by means of within- and between-analysis to explore the determinants of different 
dimensions of political instability, and the effect of political instability and financial crises on 
economic growth. Such analyses are of substantial interest as we can learn about the variation 
in the data both within countries over time and between units. Using the panel data structure 
to create internal instruments we can avoid the bias that normally leads econometricians to 
choose FE in growth regressions. The section on problems and assumptions in panel data 
models explained that endogenous variables will be lagged in the analysis to avoid 
simultaneity-bias. Robust standard errors will be computed to avoid problems of 
heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation, and tests revealed no problems of normality, 
stationarity or multicollinearity.  
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4.0 Data and Measurement 
This section presents the data, measurement and operationalization of the variables used in the 
quantitative analysis. Pennings et al. (2006:62) describes the procedure of operationalization 
as the efforts put in to obtain an operational definition of the concepts of interest, in order to 
obtain a valid transformation that may be reliably measured. The two criteria of validity and 
reliability are used to judge the quality of the chosen measurements. Validity refers to the 
degree to which the measures meaningfully capture the concept or phenomena it purports to 
measure (Pennings et al. 2006:67; Adcock and Collier 2001:529). Reliability refers to the 
dependability, or trustworthiness, of the measurement. The reliability increases when 
measurements of the same phenomena with respect to the same units deliver consistent results 
over numerous collections of data (Pennings et al. 2006:67; Grønmo 2004:220). However, 
measuring the concept of interest consistently, but poorly, is of course uninteresting. 
Therefore, reliability cannot compensate for low validity. The process and reasoning 
surrounding data and operationalization of the three main variables of interest will be 
emphasized. 
 
In what follows, I first describe the selection of the sample. Thereafter, the process of 
choosing and adjusting the three main variables are explained. Lastly, a section on controlling 
factors provides an overview of all the control variables to be employed in the analyses. 
 
Selecting the sample 
Organizing a large longitudinal data set is like solving a puzzle. Not only do the variables 
have to be valid and reliable measures, but the choice of data has to evaluate the available 
time period and missing observations to maximize the variation in the sample period that is 
chosen. The sample selection (countries and years) is therefore, inevitably, largely determined 
by the data availability. As a preventive measure against outlier problems all countries with 
less than ½ million inhabitants are excluded from the dataset. These countries have special 
characteristics, are not expected to lie on a regression line common to rich or developing 
countries, and should not be given much weight when attempting to generalize about larger 
countries (Durlauf et al. 2004:123). Historical (socialist) states are excluded. This leaves 
many countries with time series that start around 1990 and is the primary reason for the 
dataset being unbalanced.  
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What can be done about missing observations? Some countries are problematic in the sense 
that a history of political chaos means data is missing to a large degree. If countries have large 
amounts of missing data on the dependent variable then there is no variation left to explain. 
Several countries have been excluded for this reason.8  Pennings et al. (2006:66) suggest 
listwise deletion as appropriate when units are missing values on one or more of the relevant 
variables, especially in studies where N is large and the unit of observation is not extremely 
important to the overall result. Techniques to deal with countries that have less systematically 
missing data are available. Imputation using other data sources to predict the missing data is 
one possibility. More common, perhaps, is using the mean value of the relevant indicator to 
impute the missing observations. However, this produces new challenges to defending the 
validity and reliability of the data, and is disregarded since those countries excluded have data 
missing to a large degree. Modifications made to the data are specified when the specific 
measure is described. The final dataset cover a time-series from 1975-2009, including 148 
countries.9 
 
4.1 Real GDP per capita growth  
There are three potential sources for GDP levels and growth rates that are commonly used. 
The first is IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), the second is World Banks World 
Development Indicators (WDI), and the third is Penn World Tables (PWT). Several studies 
show that the choice of data source of growth rates may have consequences for results 
because of differences in data collection and in methods of adjustment for prices (Nuxoll 
1994; Hanousek, Hajkova and Filer 2008). The IFS data are gathered regularly by the IMF 
from national statistical agencies, while the WDI data combines IFS data with additional data 
collected by the World Bank staff. Lastly, the PWT data are based on the WDI data and 
additional data for developing countries obtained from OECD (Hanousek et al. 2008:1189). 
The IFS data are reported using national price weights and indigenous inflation levels, 
whereas the PWT data are adjusted to international prices by setting relative domestic prices 
equal to a weighted average of relative prices for all countries (Hanousek et al. 2008:1190). 
The purpose of the latter is to achieve cross-sectional comparability. Although the PWT data 
are used in a majority of growth studies, the adjustments made to create cross-sectional 
comparability are problematic. Nuxoll (1994) comment that the use of international prices 
                                                 
8
 Countries that fall into this group are: Afghanistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bahrain, Cambodia, Eritrea, Iraq, 
Libya, Qatar, North Korea, Serbia, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Taiwan, Hong Kong SAR, Kosovo, Macao SAR, 
Suriname, Puerto Rico, West Bank and Gaza, Montenegro. 
9
 A list of all countries is found in appendix table 4. 
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gives an upward bias in growth rates for high-income countries and a downward bias for low-
income countries. This is often referred to as the “Gerschenkron effect”.10 Nuxoll (1994) 
therefore advises researchers to use data from PWT to measure initial income levels, but that 
real GDP growth rates should be collected from sources presenting data adjusted using 
domestic price weights. More specifically, Nuxoll (1994:1434) explains: “…using domestic 
prices to measure growth rates is more reliable, because those prices characterize the trade-
offs faced by the decision-making agents, and hence they have a better foundation in the 
economic theory of index numbers.” After comparing the three common measures, Hanousek 
et al. (2008:1192) comment that “growth rates appear to be sensitive to adjustments made to 
the basic data to achieve cross-country compatibility in income levels in a single year.” For 
example, they find that PWT and IFS actually show opposite signs 14% of the time in the data 
they examine (ibid). The advice from Hanousek et al. (2008:1200) follows that of Nuxoll’s, 
that researcher should: “avoid using data that have been adjusted to create comparability 
across countries for a particular year to calculate growth over time within a given country” 
(original italics).  
 
With this argument in mind, Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) choose to use WDI data for 
real GDP per capita growth, and PWT data for initial income levels. Heston and Summers 
(1996) comment on the indifference of many scholars when told that using PWT data “the 
rates they obtained are not the same as the rates implied in the countries’ own national 
accounts” was predictable: they disregarded it entirely. The attitude that “growth is growth” 
may prove to be misleading if different measures may actually change the results of the 
analysis, as shown by Hanousek et al. (2008). Not paying attention to the process by witch the 
data are generated can produce biased inference. 
 
Choosing data 
Four sources for growth and GDP data have been considered. The PWT data have been 
criticized and their latest time series ends in 2007, therefore it is disregarded for the growth 
series.11 The time series from IMF starts in 1980 and would therefore limit the selection of 
time frame by five years. Data from United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) and WDI 
cover the favored time frame 1975-2009. The preferred growth measure is therefore the 
                                                 
10
 This refers to the sensitivity on growth rates in choosing a base year for weighting prices. See Nuxoll 
(1994:1425). 
11
 PWT 7.0 became available in May 2011, but was not available at the time when the dataset was created. 
However, the time-series is not the main reason for not choosing PWT-data. 
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World Bank’s annual GDP per capita growth rate in constant local currency (World Bank 
2010).  
 
Adjusting the data 
To proxy long-term development in economic growth it is common to average growth over 
several years. The most common is to use 5-year averages (Islam 1995; Durlauf et al. 2004; 
Jong-A-Pin 2009), but 10-year averages are also widely applied (Mankiw et al. 1992; 
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 2005). Averaging data obviously means less variation in the 
growth variable, however, it also smoothes out business cycles making it easier to identify 
permanent growth effects from short-term economic fluctuations. In addition, the problem of 
serial correlation is thought to be smaller than when annual data are applied (Islam 
1995:1140). Most economic time series fluctuate around a (typically increasing) trend. These 
fluctuations create a lot of statistical “noise”. When studying long-term growth it is explaining 
the trend, and changes in this trend that is of interest, not the fluctuations around the trend. 
One alternative to averaging economic variables is to use a time series filter to adjust for 
business cycles over time. The Hodrick-Prescott filter estimates and weighs a trend 
component and a cyclical component in long economic time series, which could be ideal to 
study a growth trend over time. However, the filter cannot capture structural change instantly, 
and uncertainty regarding the start and end-points in the time series makes it necessary to 
exclude some observations. Durlauf et al. (2004) also argue that the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
often is inappropriate in the context of developing countries where large output deviations are 
not uncommon. Therefore, the approach of averaging is chosen. I apply 5-year averages only 
if 3 out of 5 observations for the period are non-missing. This leaves every unit with a 
maximum of 7 periods (1975-79, 80-84, 85-89, 90-94, 95-99, 00-04, 05-09). 
 
4.2 Political instability 
Measuring political instability provides no easy choices for the researcher. As have become 
clear from the discussion in part two, using a single measure is not likely to capture the 
several ways in which instability might manifest itself. However, by applying different 
measurements separately or aggregated, the validity of the indicator may be increased. By 
using different measures common in the literature, the comparability of the study is also 
increased. 
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Choosing data 
The chosen variables of political instability are all well established and commonly applied in 
previous studies. However, certain databases have not been updated in quite some time, 
whereas others have start years that do not fit the time-series of this thesis. Three conditions 
have been particularly evaluated in choosing the variables. First, I only choose variables that 
are annually observed (not counting missing data due to different reasons). This excludes 
variables with few and irregular data points, such as Easterly’s (1999) “External conflict risk”, 
“Racial and Nationality tensions”, “Political terrorism”, and “Civil war risk”, applied by 
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005). Second, it is important to choose variables that are 
manifestations of political instability and not potential causes. This excludes the commonly 
used variable “Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization”, which have been argued to be a potential 
cause of instability. It also excludes subjective measures of political instability, since these 
indices are typically not event-based. Third, it is important not to choose variables that build 
on each other, thereby generating multicollinearity. This is the reason why the commonly 
used “Number of battle related deaths” and “Number of conflicts” from Gleditch, Wallensteen, 
Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand (2002) are not included. To increase comparability to the 
newest studies I rather include “War” and “Minor Armed Conflict”, which are based on the 
number of conflicts and deaths. All variables included are listed in the table on the next page. 
The quantity makes detailed discussion of each indicator outside the scope of this thesis, and I 
refer the interested reader to investigate the data sources directly. A few comments are 
nevertheless appropriate. In previous versions of the Armed Conflict Dataset, Gleditch et al. 
(2002) defined a variable for medium or intermediate conflicts defined as minor conflicts, but 
with total battle related deaths in the conflict succeeding 1000 over a period of more than one 
year. Here, the variable “Minor Armed Conflict” also represents these conflicts, although I do 
not distinguish them as an own category. Originally, the intention was to include the variable 
“Years of ruling party in office” from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, 
Groff, Keefer and Walsh 2001). However, this variable is coded with missing observations in 
the original data when: there are no parties; the chief executive is an independent; and when 
the party is in fact the army. This variable is therefore quite problematic with respect to 
missing observations. Such measurement error could also be correlated with the regime 
measures included, since the missing observations are all autocracies (except for Switzerland, 
which by definition have no chief executive). Because of this I choose to include “Years in 
office of chief executive” instead, which is also the variable that “Years of ruling party in 
office” build on.  
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Adjusting the data 
Durlauf et al. (2004) argue that indicators of political instability are valid proxies only when 
averaged over a long time period. More specifically, they refer to the indices of Barro (1991) 
including political revolutions and coups. When binary indicators of political regime change 
are applied, they relate the probability of a power transfers to the political uncertainty that 
arises from this, which is hypothesized to affect growth. When the long-term growth rate are 
of interest, these variables should therefore be averaged over time so as not to only shed light 
on the direct impact of revolutions and coups (Durlauf et al. 2004: 98-99). In this thesis, it is 
not the likelihood of regime change per se that will be estimated, however, several arguments 
still favor averaging the variables. Principal Component Analysis requires that the variables 
are interval-level-data (as do regression analysis), if not; the extraction of linear combinations 
of the variables is pointless. This argues for averaging the variables prior to the PCA. 
Although the data do not contain categorical variables, some have values that range between 0 
– 3, 4, or 5. In addition, averaging variables reduces outlier problems and help to fill in for 
randomly missing observations, which is particularly helpful since PCA cannot estimate 
components when the variables entering have missing observations. As with the growth 
variable, 5-year averages is applied. The data are not adjusted for population size. Alesina and 
Perotti (1996:1208) argue that events of political instability should be just as destructive in 
small-population countries as in large. An assassination of a central politician should have no 
lesser effect on the public in a country with ten million inhabitants, than in a country with one 
million. 12  Appendix table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all the original variables of 
political instability. 
 
Operationalization 
The findings of Jong-A-Pin’s (2009) factor analysis give an indication of how variables of 
political instability can be categorized into four dimensions reflecting different aspects of 
political instability. One problem with principal component indices of political instability is 
that one looses the ability to estimate independent impacts of the different dimensions. This is 
also the reasoning that led Campos and Nugent (2002) into constructing two indices, one for 
“severe” measures and one for “moderate” measures of political instability. Here, I choose to 
make four separate indices of political instability, reflecting political violence, civil protest, 
regime change, and government instability. These indices reflect the dimensions emphasized 
                                                 
12
 On the other hand, if a variable like “Number of Battle Related Deaths” was included, this would be a 
magnitude variable that would argue in favor of population adjustment. 
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by both Jong-A-Pin (2009) and Sanders (1981). Although a common dimensional set-up is 
adopted, the variables included are not all identical to Jong-A-Pin (2009). Since the indices 
are to be used as dependent variables in the first analysis, and to avoid multicollinearity, it is 
not desirable to include variables in more than one index. Therefore, “Changes in effective 
executive” are included only in the index of regime change, whereas “Number of veto players 
who drop from office” are included only in the government instability index.13 
 
 
 
Principal component analysis 
The basic difference between factor analysis and principal component analysis (PCA) is that 
the latter is a data reduction method applied to extract as much variance as possible from a set 
of indicators, while the first is a model constructed to extract all the information that are 
common to all indicators from the variation that is unique to a single indicator. When factor 
analysis is applied, it is first and foremost to obtain values for the underlying factors, or 
dimensions, of the phenomena in question. The decision of the appropriate number of factors 
is based on statistical tests (i.e Cattell’s scree test, Kaiser’s criterion). As elaborated on in part 
two, Jong-A-Pin finds four factors that have large scores relative to the other factors and 
therefore explains a larger part of the variance contained in all indicators. Thereafter, the 
dimensions are named according to what incidents of political instability the variables with 
sufficiently high loadings refer to.  
 
In choosing whether to perform an exploratory factor analysis or use PCA, Hair et al. 
(2006:117) suggest two criteria. First, what is the objective of the factor analysis; data 
reduction or identifying latent dimensions? Second, what prior knowledge do we have about 
the variables in question? The goal here is to create variables of political instability that 
reflects the multidimensionality of the concept (data reduction). Since several studies have 
                                                 
13
 Jong-A-Pin (2009) found these variables to load on both dimensions and therefore included them in two 
scores. 
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been performed that explore different variables of political instability, there are information 
available that allow inclusion of the relevant dimensions of the phenomena. Therefore, it is 
possible to create indices of political instability that reflects the multidimensionality of the 
concept by means of PCA, and using prior studies to identify essential variables of the 
different dimensions. 
 
PCA reduces the number of variables in the analysis by estimating linear combinations of the 
included indicators with weights for the separate indicators so that the variation is maximized 
(Pennings et al. 2006:76). The first principal component extracted is the single best linear 
relationship between the variables and contain most of the variation in the original variables. 
The second component extracted is the second best relationship that is orthogonal of the first, 
which mean it must be derived from the remaining unique variation left after the first 
extraction (Hair et al. 2006:119). It this manner, p orthogonal principal components are 
derived from the n variables included. When the indicators are measured differently this may 
affect the result if the variables are not standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 1. This would lead to the first principal component being “practically identical to 
the variable with the highest order of magnitude” (Alesina and Perotti 1996:1209). However, 
it is possible to run the analysis using the correlation matrix instead of the covariance matrix.  
This procedure returns the eigenvectors in orthonormal form (uncorrelated and normalized). 
The difference in results when using standardized variables and covariance matrix, or the 
correlation matrix, is miniscule. Since most studies in the literature follow the covariance 
procedure, I also choose this technique.  
 
The aim of the PCA is not to discover the dimensionality of the concept. Variables included 
are already thought to be the primary variables available explaining that specific dimension of 
political instability. Therefore, following Alesina and Perotti (1996), Perotti (1996), Blanco 
and Grier (2009), and several others, I use the first principal component of the variables 
covering each dimension of political instability to create four indices. These indices should be 
expected to be moderately correlated with each other since they reflect different aspects of the 
same phenomena. Table 4.3 show descriptive statistics, loadings and the variance explained 
by the first principal component for the four indices. A simple correlation show that all 
indices are moderately correlated, the highest being political violence and regime change 
(0.30) and the lowest between political violence and government instability (0.026). From the 
table we observe that the index of government instability have more missing observations 
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than the other indices. The reason for this is that most variables in this index come from Beck 
et al. (2001). The variance explained by the first principal components is relatively high, 
especially the civil protest index. 
 
 
 
One argument against using indices is that they may complicate the theoretical interpretation 
(Hardy 1979:212). If the interest of the researcher is the specific quantifiable effect of i.e. 
coups on growth, then an index may not be the preferred choice. Since it is the effect of the 
dimensions of political instability that is of primary interest here, and not specific effects, it 
suffices to know the strength and direction of the relationship, and of course whether the 
effect is statistically significant. 
 
4.3 Financial crises 
The preferred proxy for financial crisis in this thesis is the banking crisis indicator. Previously 
mentioned reasons are high correlation with other crisis measures, the vulnerability of the 
banking sector to many types of domestic and external financial distress, and because of its 
nature as a quantitatively observable incident. 
 
Banking crises 
The database of Laeven and Valencia (2010) covers all systemic and borderline banking 
crises from 1970-2009. A banking crisis is systemic when “significant signs of financial 
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distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking 
system, and bank liquidations)” is observed, in addition to “significant banking policy 
intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking system” (Laeven and 
Valencia 2010:6). 14  The data provides start years, end years, and therefore duration of 
different systemic crises. The first year that both above mentioned criteria are met is the 
starting year of a crisis. The end year of a crisis is the year before real GDP growth and real 
credit growth have been positive for at least two consecutive years (Laeven and Valencia 
2010:10). It is argued that this quantitative approach is a major improvement to earlier 
qualitative definitions, where systemic crises were those in which “a large fraction of banking 
system capital has been depleted” (Laeven and Valencia 2010:8). 
 
Knoop (2008:171) comment that the method used to determine start and end of a banking 
crisis may have implications for the results of the analysis. By Laeven and Valencia’s (2010) 
definition, in the case where growth is positive the two first years, the crisis starts and ends 
the same year. However, in the cases where this results in long crisis durations, growth may 
also be influenced by other shocks influencing economic performance (Laeven and Valencia 
2010:10). Therefore, they truncate crisis duration to five years.  
 
Adjusting the data 
The indicator for banking crisis takes the value of 1 every year the country is experiencing a 
banking crisis. Countries not experiencing a systemic banking crisis get the value 0. Although 
the crisis indicator is truncated to five years, separate crisis as in Congo Dem. Rep. 1991-1994 
and 1994-1998 will appear as one long crisis in the data. The possibility of using a binary 
indicator for the crisis variable has been weighted against the possibility of averaging out the 
variation over several years, as done by Cavallo and Cavallo (2010). They operationalize 
banking crisis as the “ratio of crisis years to total available years in the period, and range from 
0-1.” They average the variable over five-year periods so that a crisis that lasted two years 
gets a value of 0.4 for the period (Cavallo and Cavallo 2010:842). They argue that this 
incorporates the duration aspect of crises and avoids having to use a binary indicator which 
                                                 
14
 Policy intervention is ”significant” when at least three out of the following six measures have been taken: 
extensive liquidity support , bank restructuring costs, significant bank nationalizations, significant guarantees put 
in place, significant asset purchases, deposits freezes and bank holidays (Laeven and Valencia 2010:7). A 
combination of less than three measures, but on a large scale is also deemed a sufficient condition for systemic 
crises (Laeven and Valencia 2010:8). Borderline cases are crisis that “almost meet our definition of a systemic 
crises” (Laeven and Valencia 2010:9). Typically, when two out of three measures have been taken. 
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would invalidate lagged instruments. Therefore, my choice is also to average the variable over 
5 year periods as with the growth data and political instability indicators.  
 
Description of the data 
The data reveals 144 systemic or borderline systemic banking crises since 1970. These have 
occurred in 115 different countries. Excluding countries without data and limiting the time 
period to start in 1975, this leaves 138 crises in 108 different countries. See appendix table 3 
for a complete overview. The first crisis incidents are found in the Central African Republic 
and Chile in 1976, whereas the last incidents are many and started with the 2007 US banking 
crisis. These crises are defined as ongoing by the definition of Laeven and Valencia (2010). 
Argentina has experienced the most banking crises (4) and also display the overall longest 
crises duration (totally 10 years of crisis). Although the data show that most banking crises 
have occurred in Europe, all continents are represented.  
 
 
4.4 Control variables 
This section elaborates on the choice of independent variables that will be employed in both 
analyses. The measures are common and most indicators will be used both analyses. All time 
varying control variables are treated as exogenous explanatory variables and averaged over 5-
year periods, unless specified otherwise. Appendix table 2 provides descriptive statistics of 
each variable employed in the analysis. 
 
* Variables specific for the growth regressions. 
 
Income  
To measure income I use the log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita presented in real 
2005 dollars. The data is gathered from USDA (2010), which derive their data from the latest 
edition of World Bank's World Development Indicators and fill in using other sources 
(Oxford Economic Forecasting, Global Insight, Project Link, International Monetary Fund's 
International Financial Statistics).15 
 
Population growth * 
                                                 
15
 Remaining gaps in the data series is filled in by a process of interpolation, extrapolation, or back estimation 
(USDA 2010). 
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I use the annual population growth rate, which is derived from total midyear population 
including all residents (World Bank 2011). 
 
Education * 
I apply the log of primary and secondary school enrollment per capita from Banks (2010) to 
measure education. 
 
Investment * 
Investment is measured as the ratio of investment to GDP, and data is from PWT 6.3 (Heston 
et al. 2009). The investment share of real GDP per capita is in constant 2005 dollars, and the 
time period covered is 1975-2007. The reason for choosing PWT 6.3 over WDI Gross Capital 
Formation is the superior data coverage.16 Comparability across countries is obtained by the 
percentage interpretation of the investment / GDP ratio. 
 
Trade 
The measure of trade openness is from the World Bank (2011) and defined as the sum of 
exports and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP. This provides a comparable 
measure of trade as percentage of GDP. The economic globalization measure of Dreher 
(2007) was considered, but this measure is chosen because it is so commonly applied in the 
literature, and therefore increases the comparability of the results. 
 
Government spending 
Government spending is measured by the government share of real GDP per capita from PWT 
6.3 (Heston et al. 2009). This measure is also given in constant 2005 dollars and the time 
period covered is 1975-2007. Comparability across countries is obtained by the percentage 
interpretation of the government spending / GDP ratio. 
 
Inflation 
The rate of annual inflation in consumer prices is measured by the consumer price index, 
which reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring 
a basket of goods and services (World Bank 2011). This variable has several extreme values, 
i.e. Zimbabwe in 2007 where inflation was 24 411%. Negative values limit the possibility of 
                                                 
16
 This superior data coverage is obtained through a sophisticated method of extrapolations from successive 
benchmark studies of the World Bank’s International Comparison Program. 
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taking the natural logarithm. Averaging the variable over five year periods limits these 
extreme values considerably, as seen in the table below. In addition, all values are multiplied 
with 0, 01 to narrow the extreme variation and prevent heteroscedasticity. 
 
Variable    |       Mean  Std. Dev.          Min            Max 
Inflation   |      49.121     612.372        -100          24411.03 
Average Inflation  |       56.384      417.547      -16.28       8603.276 
Adjusted inflation  | 0.563       4.175      -0.162     86.032 
 
Regime 
To measure the degree of institutionalized democracy or autocracy, the Polity IV indicator by 
Marshall and Jaggers (2002) is applied. The polity2 indicator is a combined indicator of 
institutionalized democracy and institutionalized autocracy ranging from -10 to 10, where 10 
is full democracy and -10 is full autocracy. Institutionalized democracy is perceived by three 
essential elements: the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can 
express preferences, the existence of institutionalized constraints on executive power, and 
finally, the guarantee of civil liberties (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2010:14). Institutionalized 
autocracy is perceived as systems where regularized political competition and freedoms are 
restricted, chief executives are chosen by selection within the political elite, and there are few 
institutional constraints on executive power (Marshall et al. 2010:15). 
 
Political constraints * 
As an alternative to the Polity IV measure, the Political Constraints Index III (POLCON) from 
Henisz (2000) is included, which he found to be a statistically and economically significant 
determinant of economic growth. This is also an alternative measure to the quality of 
government indicator by International Country Risk Guide, which is not included since it did 
not fit the preferred time period. The POLCON data is taken from the dataset of Teorell et al. 
(2010). POLCON refers to the feasibility of policy change, and the index ranges from 0 to 1, 
where a higher number indicates more political constraints and therefore less feasibility of a 
policy change. The index-composition is more specifically described by Teorell et al. 
(2010:108) as: 
 
- The number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy change 
(more branches increasing constraint). 
- The extent of party alignment across branches of government (decreasing constraint). 
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- The extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch (increasing 
constraint for aligned executives, decreasing it for opposed executives). 
 
The assumption made by Henisz (2000:5) is that the feasibility of policy change produces 
uncertainty and thereby lower levels of investment and growth. 
 
Economic inequality 
Economic inequality is measured by the Gini-index, which varies between 0 and 100, where a 
perfectly equal distribution of income is 0 and a perfectly unequal distribution is 100. This, 
however, is a theoretical variation, since 100 would indicate that one person or household 
acquired the society’s total income, and 0 that everyone acquired an equal share of total 
income. 
 
I use two sources for data on economic inequality. All Gini-data are based on an income 
concept and a survey. The World Income Inequality database, version WIID2c (UNU-
WIDER 2008), have compiled a large dataset based on different sources, which for this 
reason also vary in their primary sources for income, population, and type of survey 
conducted. Because of this, a quality rating is assigned to each observation based on whether 
the concepts underlying the observations are known or not, the coverage of the 
income/consumption concept, and the survey quality (UNU-WIDER 2008:14-15). The quality 
rating ranges from 1 (highest reliability) to 4 (lowest reliability). The WIID2c data is gathered 
from Teorell et al. (2010). Many units have multiple observations for each year. In these cases, 
Teorell et al. (2010) include the mean of the highest quality observations. To supplement the 
WIID2c data, where the time-series end in 2006, I include the Gini measure from the World Bank 
(2011). This should be unproblematic since both are secondary sources, which are compilations of 
different primary data. In many cases the data also overlap, since the primary sources are the same. 
 
Although having combined two sources of data, observations are very scarce, which leads to a 
very unbalanced panel and a significant loss of total observations (1734 of potentially 5180 is 
available before averaging into 7 periods). Therefore, I choose to use the constant average value 
for every unit to obtain stability. The negative consequence of this is the loss of variation in the 
variable, however, the loss of observations, and therefore weaker predictive capability, is seen as a 
greater evil. To avoid giving weight to observations with low reliability, the observations based on 
only one source with very poor rating are excluded before averaging. 
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Social inequality 
Social inequality is measured by ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003). This variable 
defines ethnicity as a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics. This measure use the 
same formula as the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) variable, computed as one minus 
the Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic group shares, thereby showing the probability that two 
random individuals from the population belong to different groups (Alesina et al. 2003:158-
159).17 The ethnic composition of a society changes very slowly, and is therefore used as a 
constant measure. 
 
Regional instability 
Regional instability is understood as political instability in neighboring countries. This 
operationalization emphasizes the importance of geographical proximity (Ades and Chua 
1997). Since it is most likely that visible events of political instability are those that may be 
contagious across borders, the index of government instability, or within-country instability, 
is not included to create the measure of regional instability. I use the five-year averaged index 
values of political violence, civil protest and regime change in i neighboring countries, 
divided by the number of neighboring countries 1/n, to denote a country j amounts of regional 
instability in a given five-year period t.18 
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Excluded variables 
Because of the large number of countries included in the analysis, some variables were 
dropped due to large amounts of missing observations. Most prominently this concerns the 
measures of unemployment and government debt, for which the data coverage in developing 
countries is especially poor. Inclusion of these variables would lead to an extreme drop in 
degrees of freedom and would negatively affect the overall results of the analysis. Since many 
countries have very few, or no observations at all on these variables, processes of 
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, when sij is the share of group i (i = 1,…, N) in country j. 
18
 The list of neighboring countries is found in the appendix table 3, and was created using CIA’s World 
Factbook (2011).  
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extrapolation or back estimation is deemed infeasible. Using the variables as constant 
measures is also disregarded. 
 
 
4.5 Chapter summary  
This chapter has described the data, measurement, sources and operationalization of the 
variables which will be employed in the analyses. The dataset includes 148 countries over a 
period of 35 years (1975-2009). The data have been averaged into 7 five-year periods to treat 
the heterogeneity in growth rates, to obtain valid proxies for political instability, and to 
capture the duration aspect of banking crises. This leaves the dataset with a maximum N of 
1036.  
 
In section 4.1, it was argued that using a growth measure based on domestic inflation levels 
was most appropriate. Section 4.2 described the measures of political instability, the 
operationalization of political instability into four dimensions (political violence, civil protest, 
regime change, government instability), and the resulting indices based on the first principal 
components. Section 4.3 elaborated on the banking crisis indicator and gave a description of 
the data. Lastly, section 4.4 presented the control variables to be employed in both analyses. 
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5.0 Analyses 19 
This chapter presents the results of the two analyses. Empirical studies do not only have to 
consider methods and data, but also how one wants to structure the analysis. The structure of 
the analysis should depend on the purpose of the analysis, which may be quite different in 
different settings. One goal may be to explain the variation in the dependent variable as 
completely as possible, while another study may have as its primary goal to explore the effect 
of one particular variable (Skog 2004: 258-259). As previously mentioned, the first analysis in 
this thesis is exploratory. The dependent variables of political instability have been made for 
the purpose of this thesis to investigate the multidimensionality of the phenomena. The main 
interest is therefore to test previous theoretical determinants of political instability, and to 
investigate what effect financial crises have on the dependent variables. The second analysis 
is confirmatory. Durlauf et al. (2004:73) comment that the bulk of empirical growth studies 
explore potential determinants in search of the “true” growth model. These studies typically 
focus on a particular variable, try to uncover the heterogeneity in growth, or test potential 
nonlinearities. There exists a multitude of growth regressions and the primary purpose of 
performing such an analysis in this thesis is to test the appropriateness of modeling political 
instability as multidimensional. 
 
5.1 Financial crises and political instability 
The first question to be empirically tested is whether financial crises cause political 
instability. The following hypotheses were presented in section 2.3: 
 
 
                                                 
19
 The estimation of all models is conducted using Stata’s - xtreg…,re - command with the option – vce(robust). 
This provides GLS estimation with robust standard errors, correcting for disturbances not being identically 
distributed in the panel and serial correlation.  
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Practical approach 
Since the operationalization of political instability led to four separate variables, I will 
perform four separate analyses in this first part. To increase the clarity and make the 
presentation easy to follow, I first perform the analysis of political violence, then civil protest 
etc. This way, one table represents the analysis of one dimension of political instability. I start 
each analysis by including the within- and between-effects of all time-varying control 
variables, and the unit-constant measures, to see what determinants are relevant for this 
particular dimension of instability. The second regression excludes the insignificant control 
variables and includes the main explanatory variable of interest: financial crises, and its 
interaction with the level of income. The third model introduces the other measures of 
instability as controls. These are expected to be the most powerful factors explaining other 
dimensions of political instability. The fourth and final model includes all significant control 
variables (only the relevant within- or between-effects), the crisis variables, and the variables 
of instability. 
 
In this manner, the models will move from a special to a general model.20 Verbeek (2008:59) 
warn that the danger of data mining is high when specification goes from simple to general. 
However, the relevance of all included variables in this analysis has been pre-specified. The 
purpose of this approach is to make the analysis clear and as parsimonious as possible 
although the analysis includes many variables. A second reason is to end up with robust final 
models that highlight what determinants are important for different types of political 
instability. This also mean that it is first and foremost the final results that are interesting to 
discuss, and not all preliminary analysis since both direction, strength and significance may 
change as unimportant variables are excluded and once new controls are introduced. When all 
the models are presented, I discuss the common findings in light of the research question, 
theory and previous findings. 
 
Appropriateness of random effects 
In all models, the null hypothesis of the Hausman specification test could not be rejected. 
Thus we conclude that there is no correlation between the unit-specific effects and the 
                                                 
20
 As Verbeek (2008:59-60) comment, most studies start “somewhere ‘in the middle’” between the special-to-
general and general-to-specific (LSE) approach, depending on the question of interest, data, space, etc. This is 
also true here. 
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explanatory variables. This was expected because of the introduction of specific within- and 
between-effects in the random effects models. 
 
Issues regarding multicollinearity 
Including an interaction term may lead to problems of multicollinearity. As can be seen from 
the table below, the correlation between the interaction term GDP*Crisis (between effect) and 
the Crisis variable (between effect) is almost perfect. Because of this, I choose not to include 
an interaction effect of the between-effect in the regressions.  
 
                | GDP*Crisis (W) GDP*Crisis (B) 
GDP*Crisis (B)  | -0.1218      
Crisis (W)  | -0.2075   -0.0000 
Crisis (B)  | -0.1441   0.9699    
GDP (W)  | -0.0848  -0.0000    
GDP (B)  |  0.0744   0.1520     
 
Because of the high correlation between Government Instability, Polity2 and POLCON, these 
measures are not included in the same regression as explanatory variables. This high 
correlation also suggests that the government instability index reflect the dichotomy 
democracy/autocracy. High values on the index are typically found for democracies, while 
autocracies score low values. Jong-A-Pin (2009:20) found a similar result for his “within” 
dimension of political instability, though potential problems due to this in the growth 
regressions were not discussed. 
 
               | Government Instability  Polity IV         
Polity IV  |         0.7424        
POLCON  |         0.7299      0.8308 
 
 
5.1.1 Financial crises and Political Violence 
The first regression including all control variables show that the between-effect of trade 
openness is significant and negative as expected. The between-effect of government spending, 
on the other hand, shows a positive effect on political violence, this is contrary to the 
expectation. GDP per capita and regional instability is also significant at 10% and has the 
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expected effect. Inflation, polity, and social and economic inequality show no significant 
effect and are therefore dropped.  
 
 
 
Regression 2 includes the effect of financial crises and an interaction term between crises and 
GDP per capita. The within-effect of financial crises on political violence is positive and 
significant at 10%. The expected effect of the interaction term is that: because financial crises 
may decrease income and therefore create tension, the positive effect of crises on political 
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instability is amplified. The effect of the interaction term shows the contrary. GDP per capita 
mitigates the positive effect of crises on political violence. 
 
)( 814.0485.0
 
  GDP
Crises
ViolencePolitical
−=
∂
∂
 
 
However, the interaction term is insignificant (both z-value and F-test).21 The VIF-values in 
regression 2 do not indicate problems of multicollinearity (VIF GDP*Crisis = 1.09). It 
appears that the effect of financial crises on political violence is not conditional upon the level 
of income. We observe that the within-effect of trade openness also become significant when 
controlling for financial crises, as do the within-effect of government spending. The between-
effect of government instability looses its significance.  
 
The third regression introduces other types of political instability as controls. Since it is likely 
that instability spurs instability it is central to control for such events. We observe that this 
does not alter the results from regression 2 to a large degree. The effect of regional instability 
looses its significance. Civil protests and regime changes increase political violence, while 
government instability displays a negative effect on political violence. This between-effect is 
only weakly significant at 10%. Because of the centrality of these variables, they are all kept 
in the last regression. 
 
In the final regression, regional instability and the between-effect of government spending is 
excluded. We see that financial crises significantly increase political violence within 
countries. Remember that political violence is measured as assassinations, guerilla warfare, 
revolutions, armed conflict, purges and war, meaning that financial crises may have very 
severe consequences. Trade openness significantly decreases political violence both within 
and between countries, while government spending increases political violence within 
countries. Civil protest and regime change increase political violence, and there is a weakly 
significant moderating effect of government instability between countries. Countries with 
higher mean government instability experience less political violence on average. 
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5.1.2 Financial crises and Civil Protest 
In regression 1 we observe a negative between-effect of trade openness on civil protest. 
Regional instability significantly increases the amount of civil protest within countries, while 
the within-effect of income decreases civil protest. The insignificant variables are again 
dropped in the second regression and financial crises and its interaction with income is 
introduced.  
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Financial crises have a significant positive effect on civil protest. More surprisingly, the 
average level of income also affects civil protest positively between countries. The interaction 
effect again shows the opposite effect of what was expected.22 The effect is also insignificant 
(both z-values and F-test).23 The VIF-values in the second regression do not indicate problems 
of multicollinearity (VIF GDP*Crisis = 1.08). Trade keeps it significance, while the between-
effect of regional instability becomes significant and positive. 
 
When other sources of instability are controlled for in regression 3, the effects of income, 
crises and regional instability become insignificant. The effect of political violence is 
significant at 10% between countries, and regime changes within countries increase civil 
protest. The effect of government instability is interesting. The within-effect is negative while 
the between-effect is positive.  
 
In the final model, the income variable and regional instability are dropped. The insignificant 
trade variable from regression 3 is kept. The reason for this is that excluding it led to a 
rejection of the Hausman test. It may be that that the unit-mean of trade correlates with other 
effects when the within-variation is not accounted for. Financial crises are significant only at 
10%. The effect of trade openness is significantly negative between countries, and the 
between-effect of political violence also become significant at 10%. Regime changes within 
countries increase civil protest.  
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23
 F = ((0.1250- 0.1250)/(9-8))/((1-0.1250)/(916-9-1)) = 0. F0,05 (1, 906) = 3,85 > 0. 
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The effects of government instability keep its significance. Increasing government instability 
within countries has a negative effect on civil protest, while the effect between countries is 
positive. Since the measure of government instability is highly correlated with regime 
indicators, higher values of government instability are also found in more democratic 
countries. Table 5.3 ranks the countries with the top five and bottom five scores of 
government instability. Higher fractionalization and polarization, more elections and dropped 
veto players, and fewer years of chief executive in office, indicates more democratic changes. 
These events do not regularly occur in autocracies. Therefore, the democratic changes that are 
captured by the index of government instability most likely decrease the amount of general 
strikes, riots and demonstrations (captured by the civil protest index). However, between 
countries, higher mean values of government instability also have higher values of civil 
protest and therefore this effect is positive. This may be due to the fact that events of civil 
protest become rarer the more undemocratic a country is. The predicted different within- and 
between-effects are shown in figure 5.1 below. This effect would not have been revealed 
unless the model had specific within- and between-effects. 
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5.1.3 Financial crises and Regime Change 
 
 
 
Regression 1 shows that the level of income decreases regime changes both within and 
between countries. Trade openness is significantly negative for regime change, while the 
between-effect of government spending, both effects of inflation, and the within-effect of 
regional instability lead to more regime changes. Polity is insignificant, as is economic and 
social inequality. These are dropped when estimating regression 2. 
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Including financial crises and its interaction with income show no significant effect on regime 
change (neither z-statistics nor F-test).24 The direction of the interaction term is again the 
opposite of the expected effect.25 The VIF-values in the second regression do not indicate 
problems of multicollinearity due to the interaction term (VIF GDP*Crisis = 1.07). The 
within-effect of income looses its significance and the between-effect drop in significance to 
10%. The between-effect of government spending also drops in significance to 10%. All other 
results do not change their level of significance.  
 
Regression 3 shows that when controlling for other dimensions of political instability several 
results change or become insignificant. The between-effect of income shows that the level of 
income varies negatively with regime changes. There are fewer regime changes in rich 
countries than in poor. The within-effect of trade becomes significantly negative, while the 
between-effect loses significance. Countries which become more open over time experience 
less regime changes. The between-effect of government spending indicates that regime 
changes are more common in countries where the government controls a larger part of total 
spending. Inflation within countries increases regime changes significantly. 
 
The results from regression 3 stay the same in the final regression, although the insignificant 
effects are dropped. More political violence and more civil protests within countries increase 
regime changes significantly. Government instability both within and between countries also 
increase regime change. As higher values of government instability mean more democratic 
changes, these results are puzzling. One possible explanation may be that this effect shows the 
fragility of new democracies to regime changes. When regimes become more democratic over 
time, they experience more regime changes. This is part of the instable transition-part of 
making democracy work. The between-effect indicates that the occurrence of regime changes 
is higher in countries with high mean-values of government instability, than in countries with 
low mean-values.  
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 F= ((0.1140- 0.1119)/(13-12))/((1-0.1140)/(780-13-1)) = 1.81. F0,05 (1, 766) = 3,85 > 1,81. 
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5.1.4 Financial crises and Government Instability 
 
 
 
In regression 1, the within-effect of inflation and the within- and between-effect of Polity IV 
are significant. As expected, there is more government instability in democracies. The 
constant measure of social inequality is also significant at 10%. In regression 2, the between-
effect of financial crises is significant and positive, while the interaction effect shows no 
significance (neither z-statistics nor F-test).26 The direction of the effect is also in this model 
                                                 
26
 F = ((0.5499- 0.5498)/(10-9))/((1-0.5499)/(678-10-1)) = 0,148. F0,05 (1, 667) = 3,85 > 0,148. 
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the opposite of the expectation. 27  Financial crises do not have an effect on government 
instability that is conditional upon income. The VIF-values do not indicated problems of 
multicollinearity due to the interaction term (VIF GDP*Crisis = 1.07). The within-effect of 
inflation drops in significance to 10% and the significance of social inequality increase to 1%.  
 
Regression 3 drops the income measure and the interaction term. Controlling for other 
dimensions of political instability does not change the significance of the other variables. 
Political violence is insignificant. Civil protest within countries significantly decreases 
government instability, indicating that less changes and instability of a democratic nature 
occur when civil protest increases. Regime change increases government instability both 
within countries over time, and between countries meaning that those countries with high 
mean values of regime change also are governmentally instable. Regime changes actually 
contribute to more changes of a democratic nature when controlling for democracy. The 
between-effect of financial crises loses its weak significance in the last regression when the 
insignificant between-effect of inflation is removed. Social inequality, defined as ethnic and 
linguistic fractionalization, significantly decrease government instability. Socially unequal 
countries experience less governmental instability and less democratic changes of 
government.  
 
5.1.5 Discussion 
The direct effect of financial crises significantly increases political violence within countries, 
and also civil protest within countries (at 10% significance). First, we might note that only 
socio-political instability seems to be the product of financial crises. It is the civil society that 
reacts to episodes of financial crises through protest or violence. Crises do not trigger regime 
changes or government instability. The fact that financial crises does not lead to instability 
within or changes of regimes is nonetheless a finding that is of interest. First of all, it may 
indicate that problems caused by crises are solved within the existing regime. Second, this 
result contradicts previous studies showing that regime changes are more common during 
crisis-periods (Gasiorowski 1995; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson 
2001). 
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It does not seem to be an indirect effect of financial crises on political instability conditional 
upon a drop in income. The interaction effects are insignificant in all models. However, this 
result may stem from the fact that what is being investigated here is the long-term effect of 
financial crises. The effect of crises on political instability through income is likely to be short 
term. As a crisis hits, income drop and recession sets in, but over a five year period, this 
shock-effect has stabilized.  
 
The most important determinants of political instability are other events of political 
instability. That events of political instability spur or trigger other events is not surprising. 
Both Alesina et al. (1996) and Londregan and Poole (1990) found political instability to be 
persistent over time. Civil protest and regime change significantly increase political violence. 
There is also more political violence in countries that have higher average values of civil 
protest and regime change. Countries that experience more governmental instability and 
democratic changes, on average have lower levels of political violence. Civil protest is 
significantly increased by regime changes within countries and political violence (significant 
at 10%). There is also more civil protest in countries where political violence is high. The 
contradictory effect of government instability on civil protest was discussed in section 5.1.2. 
Increasing government instability decrease civil protest within countries, but on average, 
countries with higher government instability (more changes of a democratic nature) 
experience more civil protest. Political violence, civil protest, and government instability all 
increase regime change within countries. The between-effect of government instability is also 
positive, demonstrating that more democratic changes occur in countries that experience 
regime changes. Civil protest significantly decreases government instability within countries, 
while regime changes increase government instability. It is interesting that the relationship 
between changes of the regime and changes within the regime is positive. Stable autocracies 
will by definition experience few regime changes and few democratic changes, however, just 
as events of civil protest become rarer the more undemocratic a country, the amount of 
democratic changes increase as an effect of changes in the regime.  
 
Since all these results may be quite heavy to digest, the figure on the next page illustrate the 
significant findings of diffusion, or contagion, among the dimensions of political instability. 
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The effect of regional instability disappears when we control for other dimensions of political 
instability in every analysis. Diffusion effects across borders are unimportant compared to 
instability in the country itself. This was also the finding of Blanco and Grier (2009). 
 
The effect of income on instability is only found significant between countries with respect to 
regime changes. Countries with high average income experience less regime changes, which 
is in line with the expected effect. Increasing trade openness within countries has a significant 
negative effect on political violence and regime changes. Countries with higher average trade 
openness also experience less civil protest and political violence. All these findings are in line 
with previous results. For example, Goldstone et al. (2005) found the probability of political 
instability much higher in countries that traded less. Trade liberalization could therefore 
promote political stability.  
 
On the other hand, the findings on government spending were not expected. Higher 
government spending within countries increase political violence significantly, and 
government spending is on average higher in countries with more regime changes. This is 
similar with the results of Cuzan et al. (1988). Annett (2000) suggest that governments may 
use consumption expenditure to transfer resources to various groups, thereby reducing 
tensions and instability. Government spending may, however, also be used for myopic 
purposes by turning state funds into private funds, and therefore create more conflict and 
instability.  
Political violence 
Civil protest 
Regime change 
Government instability 
Figure 5.2:             The contagiousness of political instability 
Socio-political unrest Executive/regime instability 
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Inflation significantly increases regime changes and decreases government instability. This 
confirms the result of Cuikerman et al. (1992) that high inflation may be destabilizing. 
Gasiorowski (1995) also found high inflation, or inflationary crises, to be significantly related 
to regime changes. Increasing inflation is negative for government instability within regimes 
associated with democratic changes. Economic inequality is not found to affect political 
instability in these analyses. The difference in economic inequality between countries is not a 
significant determinant of political instability. Social inequality, however, as measured by the 
degree of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, is a significant determinant of government 
instability. Countries that are more fragmented experience less democratic changes, but 
fragmentation and distinct ethnic groups are not a feature common for countries experiencing 
violent upheaval, protest or changes of the regime.  
 
In contrast to Blanco and Grier (2009), who find that regime type is a significant determinant 
of political instability in Latin America, I do not find regime to be a significant determinant of 
political violence, civil protest nor regime change. On the other hand, democracy is a 
significant determinant of government instability, both within countries over time and 
between countries. This dimension of political instability was not represented in Blanco and 
Griers (2009) index of instability. As indicated earlier, this dimension of political instability is 
different, as it captures events and expectations of changes that are democratic in nature. Such 
instability need not be harmful, and possibly would it be more accurately described as some 
form of “democratic changes”, which have been mentioned repeatedly. Furthermore, 
fractionalization and polarization are not events per se, but describe a situation that is present 
over a period, typically until the next election. If such measures are included in indices of 
instability, it is vital that one is aware of the type of instability that is captured, or else it might 
give a biased picture of the effect of/on political instability. This is also a clear argument for 
highlighting the multidimensionality of political instability.  
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5.2 Political instability and economic growth 
We now turn to the second question to be empirically tested: how political instability affects 
economic growth. Specifying the hypothesized effect from figure 3, the following overview 
of the expected effects can be made: 
 
 
 
The following hypothesis was also presented, regarding the relationship between financial 
crises and economic growth: 
 
H11:   Financial crises decrease economic growth. 
H11A:  Financial crises have positive long-run effects on growth. 
H12:   A poor institutional environment amplifies the negative economic effects of 
financial crises on growth. 
 
The control variables included have not been emphasized in the theoretical part on growth. 
These variables are thoroughly described by the literature on growth and have been 
empirically tested numerous times. Space limits treatment of this in the confirmatory part of 
this thesis. I therefore advice the uninformed reader to consult this vast literature for the 
theoretical background of democracy and growth, inflation and growth, and so on. 
 
Practical approach 
I follow most growth studies in building the empirical growth model. First, I estimate the 
basic Solow framework including the variables of political instability. Second, I add financial 
crises to the regression. None of the variables in this basic set-up are removed if found 
insignificant, due to their centrality. The third regression includes a number of economic 
control variables and regression four controls for other political and social factors. These are 
kept if significant. The results of the first four regressions are found in table 5.6 below. In 
Political Violence 
Civil Protest 
Regime Change 
Government Instability 
Economic 
growth 
Uncertainty   
Property rights            
Taxes     
Infrastructure   
Emigration    
Government myopia   
Unemployment   
- 
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table 5.7, regression 5-7 test hypothesis H12 by including the regime and institutional 
measures Polity IV and POLCON, and an interaction term between POLCON and the crisis 
variable. The final model (8) includes the significant results.  
 
5.2.1 The effect of political instability on growth 
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To ensure that causality runs in the right direction, the variables of political instability are 
lagged by one year. The banking crises variable is not lagged, as it is quite likely that financial 
crises have an immediate effect on the economy. Remember that due to potential 
multicollinearity, government instability, Polity and POLCON are not included together.  
 
Starting with the primary variables of interest, we observe that the effect of regime change on 
economic growth is negative in all specifications. On the contrary, government instability is 
positive for growth in all specifications. These are the same results as Jong-A-Pin (2009). 
However, I find the government instability variable to be consistently positive in all 
specifications, while Jong-A-Pin’s “within” results were sensitive to the exclusion of certain 
controlling factors. Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) also find that government (in)stability 
variables may display positive effects on growth. This also indicates higher growth rates in 
democracies since it is democracies that experience different types of democratic changes 
captured by the government instability variable. Darby et al. (2004) argued that political 
instability within governments could reduce the probability of re-election, leading to lower 
public investment and therefore lower growth rates. This view of government myopia creating 
short-sightedness is not found here. More political competition within the regime is good for 
economic growth, as indicated by Besley et al. (2005).  
 
The results of Jong-A-Pin (2009) are also confirmed, with respect to political violence and 
civil protest. These dimensions of political instability do not appear to affect growth 
significantly. Jong-A-Pin finds that negative growth has a causal effect on political violence 
when examining reverse direction of causality, which may be the reason for this insignificant 
result. It is changes within the regime or of the regime that affect the growth rate of the 
economy. The argument of Alesina and Perotti (1996), that the only policy changes that are 
relevant for economic decisions occur when government change, are therefore confirmed.  
These results indicate that the “add-all-inn-and-stir” recipe for political instability, as Kong 
(2007) warns about, is not appropriate, and could give a wrong impression of the relationship 
between political instability and growth. Feng (2003:322) also argued that minor and major 
political instability would have different consequences for growth and that if Sanders’ (1981) 
results were correct, studies of political instability and growth would be theoretically 
meaningless and lead to confusing results unless political instability is differentiated.  
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Financial crises significantly decrease growth in the long-run. This effect is also significant 
between countries, meaning that countries that experience more crises on average also have 
lower growth rates. This result confirm the findings of Cavallo and Cavallo (2010), who warn 
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that the common moral-hazard view, that countries should experience crises to learn from 
their mistakes, can be misleading if the institutional environment is ignored. This finding also 
contradicts the results of Rancière et al. (2008), that countries which have experienced 
financial crises have grown faster on average than countries with stable financial conditions. 
It seems that financial liberalization does not necessarily strengthen financial development 
and lead to higher long-run growth if a consequence of liberalization is more financial crises. 
 
In table 5.7, regressions 5 – 7 test the hypothesis that the effect of financial crises is 
contingent upon the institutional environment. In regression 5, the Polity variable is 
significantly positive (at 10%) within countries. Strengthening democratic institutions 
therefore have a positive effect on economic growth. Regression 6 shows that more political 
constraints have a positive effect on economic growth. More independent branches of 
government, less party alignment across branches, and more preference heterogeneity in 
legislative branches are good for economic growth. Henisz (2000) argued that this would 
lower the feasibility of policy change and therefore provide more certainty and a positive 
environment for growth. A high POLCON score consequently mean more constraints on 
sudden changes in policies.  
 
Since the POLCON variable show highest significance, I use this to test hypothesis H12 and 
create the interaction term with financial crises in regression (7). The within-effect of the 
interaction term has the expected direction, which means that the negative effect of financial 
crises on economic growth is moderated by more political constraints.  
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The between-effect of POLCON is negative, indicating lower average growth rates in 
countries with higher average level of political constraints. However, the interaction term of 
the between-effect is also positive, implying the same result. 
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As opposed to Cavallo and Cavallo (2010) who find this interaction to significantly reduce the 
negative effect of crises, I find no significant relationships (z-statistics and F-test).28 The VIF-
value of the interactions is 5.30 (between-effect) and 1.04 (within-effect), which is higher 
than the other variables, but should not cause serious problems of multicollinearity. Because 
of the insignificance of the interaction terms, I do not explore the characteristics of these 
effects further. 
 
The final regression (8) includes the government instability variable and excludes POLCON 
due to possible multicollinearity. All significant control variables are also included in the final 
model. The negative effect of GDP per capita is in growth regressions interpreted as a 
confirmation of the convergence hypothesis. As the level of income increases, the growth rate 
converges to a lower stabile pace. This is shown to be significant both over time within 
countries, and between countries, as countries with a high level of income have a lower 
average growth rate. The initial positive within-effect of investment looses its significance 
when we control for other economic, social and political determinants of growth. In the final 
regression, the effects of investment are significant at 10%. Investment is on average higher in 
countries with higher growth rates, and increasing investment may increase growth.  
 
Something that FE regressions would fail to capture is the significant between-effect of 
population growth. Countries that have high average population growth experience lower 
economic growth per capita. Trade openness is a robust positive determinant of economic 
growth within countries. The effect of government spending, however, is more peculiar. The 
within-effect is significantly negative for growth, while the between-effect is positive. 
Countries that have increased their government spending over time also have decreased their 
growth rates. One explanation of this could be that countries that become richer, and converge 
towards a lower growth rate, also increase their government spending as their welfare states 
expand. However, the countries that have high average government spending also have high 
growth rates, possibly reflecting the rich/poor dichotomy. Not surprisingly, inflation within 
countries is negative for economic growth. This result is also robust to different 
specifications. Ades and Chua (1997) found that regional instability had a strong negative 
effect on economic performance. This result is confirmed here, and the effect is shown to be 
geographical. What affects growth is not the change in regional instability over time, but the 
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 F = ((0.3218- 0.3187)/(26-24))/((1-0.3218)/(736-26-1)) = 1.620. F0,05 (2, 709) = 3,00 > 1,620. 
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average amount of political instability in the region. Countries confined to unstable regions of 
the world have lower average economic growth. Lastly, economic inequality is found to be 
negative for economic growth. Countries with higher inequality have lower average growth 
rates. This confirms the results of Perotti (1996) among others.  
 
Appropriateness of random effects 
In the final model (8), the null hypothesis of the Hausman specification test could not be 
rejected. Therefore, we again conclude that there is no correlation between the unit-specific 
effects and the explanatory variables. This indicates that it is possible to include between-
variation in growth studies without leaving the estimates biased. To verify that the estimation 
using within- and between-variables have the desired effect, regression (8) was estimated with 
ordinary variables and a Hausman test was performed on the FE and RE estimates. The results 
was chi2(13) = 69.43, Prob>chi2 = 0.0000, and a rejection of the null hypothesis. The 
conclusion is therefore that the within- and between-variables have the desired effect.  
 
 
5.3 Answering a possible criticism 29 
It may be argued that estimating separate within- and between-effects is not always 
appropriate. Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008:121) argue that an advantage of setting these 
effects equal (including the original variable) is that the effect will be more precisely 
estimated because the RE-estimator weighs the within- and between-variation optimally. This 
would be appropriate when there are no significant differences of the within- and between-
effects. As a test of robustness, the variables in regression (8) were tested for significant 
differences and the original variables were included when no significant differences could be 
found. The specific within- and between-effects already revealed are not tested as it is 
assumed that the relevant effects of these variables have already been found. The results are 
presented in table 5.8 and 5.9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 The corresponding tests for analysis 5.1 can be found in appendix table 7 and 8. 
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Results suggest that if we follow the advice of Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008), only 
population growth, government instability and government spending should be modeled with 
specific within- and between- effects. These variables also display opposite signs on their 
effects. Estimating regression (8) with the structure suggested by the test-results does not 
change the results to a large degree. GDP per capita and investment increase their 
significance, as do the between-effect of government spending. The Hausman test reveals that 
this approach also is valid and that there is no correlation between the unit-specific effects and 
the explanatory variables. 
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5.3.1 Additional sensitivity tests 
 
Outliers 
Dropping all countries with under one million inhabitants does not change the results in any 
of the analyses (unreported). Testing this group of countries is important for the same reasons 
that led to the exclusion of countries with under ½ million inhabitants. Such countries are 
often thought to have special characteristics.  
 
Campos and Nugent (2002) argued that their findings were driven by the set of Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) countries in their sample. Jong-A-Pin (2009) did not find that excluding 
different regions had an effect on his main findings. As a robustness check, results of the 
growth regression were estimated after excluding the SSA countries. 
 
 
 
Most importantly, we see that when excluding SSA, the positive effect of government 
instability on growth disappears. SSA countries are a driving force of negative values on the 
government instability index. Excluding SSA increases the sample-mean of the government 
instability index from 0.02 to 0.43. 
 
Non-linearity 
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Barro (1994) and Carmignani (2003) argue that the effect of democracy on growth may be 
non-linear. I find no significant non-linear effects of including a quadratic term of the within- 
and between effect of Polity IV in regression 5 table 5.7 (unreported). 
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6.0 Conclusion 
This section will repeat the most important findings and answer the research question. I start 
by identifying some common findings which I regard as relevant also outside the specific 
topics considered in the analyses performed here. Thereafter, the specific findings of the two 
analyses are treated, and support for the hypotheses are evaluated. Following this, I answer 
the research question specifically. Lastly, the contribution of this thesis is summed up, and 
some thoughts for future research are given. 
 
Common findings 
First of all, I find clear indications that modeling political instability as multidimensional is 
appropriate. As the first analysis reveals, different determinants are important for the distinct 
dimensions of political instability, and one type of instability may influence the other 
dimensions differently. In the growth context, a multidimensional approach exposes that some 
dimensions are unimportant (political violence and civil protest), while other dimensions have 
contradictory effects on growth (regime change and government instability). Capturing the 
effect, and especially the much discussed causal effect, of political instability therefore seems 
futile if one does not make a clear distinction between the different dimensions of political 
instability.  
 
Second, the approach of modeling specific within- and between-effects is beneficial. This 
allows the more efficient random effects estimator to be applied, one may include constant 
explanatory variables in the analyses, and the findings of differing within- and between-
effects are of considerable theoretical interest to the researcher. The situations where the 
within- and between-effects had opposite signs would have led to ecological fallacy if a fixed 
effects approach were used and it would lead to biased estimates using normal variables 
within a random effects framework. 
 
Financial crises and political instability 
Table 6.1 presents the results of the first analysis and the effects of the different dimensions of 
political instability. I find support for four of the hypotheses (H1, H2, H3, and H5). Financial 
crises and inflation are found to increase political instability as expected, while income and 
trade decrease political instability. Financial crises trigger or contribute to socio-political 
unrest measured by indices of political violence and civil protest. There are found no evidence 
that crises trigger changes in or of regimes. The effect of government spending is found to be 
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the opposite of what was expected. Increasing government spending significantly increase 
political instability (political violence and regime change). 
 
Table 6.1 Results of analysis 1: answering the hypothesis. 
 
 
 
All of the findings regarding the government instability variable were found to contradict the 
expected effects. The reason is that this variable captures events of democratic change that 
normally occur in democracies. Therefore, this index is found to be highly correlated with 
regime measures, and also display a contradictory interpretation from the other indices of 
instability. More government instability is “better” in the sense that this reflects the normal 
procedures of a democratic state (more elections, fractionalization, polarization, dropped veto 
players and fewer years in office of chief executive). However, since the effects are 
nonetheless found to contradict my hypothesized effects, this is what the table display. 
 
The analyses of the different dimensions of political instability have shown the persistency 
and diffusion of instability. The results indicate that political instability is a main cause of 
political instability. Or put another way: political instability is contagious. Events of political 
violence may lead to protests or regime changes. Protest may feed violent acts and lead to 
changes in and of regimes, while changes of regimes are important events which affect all 
other dimensions of instability. With respect to government instability, the effect on the other 
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dimensions suggests that the nature of this variable is somewhat different. More changes of a 
democratic nature moderate political violence and civil protest, although countries with a high 
average amount of democratic changes experience more protest than countries which 
experience few changes. Government instability is also shown to increase the amount of 
regime changes. 
 
Financial crises and growth 
I find strong evidence that financial crises are detrimental to economic growth. The 
hypothesized positive long-run effect of crises on growth is not supported. Nor is the 
hypothesis that a poor institutional environment amplifies the negative economic effects of 
crises. 
 
Table 6.2: Financial crises and growth: answering the hypotheses. 
 
 
 
Political instability and growth 
I find that socio-political unrest has no effect on the growth rate of the economy, whereas 
changes of the regime significantly lower growth in the long-run, and changes in the regime is 
positive for growth in the long-run. SSA countries are shown to be the driving force behind 
the latter result because of their generally low values of government instability, meaning that 
few changes of a democratic nature occur in this region. 
 
It was hypothesized that political instability affected growth negatively through several 
mechanisms. These mechanisms have not been tested specifically and the relationships 
revealed may therefore be both direct effects and indirect effects on growth. The analyses 
conducted in this thesis can only conclude that there at least is a direct effect of political 
instability on growth. Figure 6.1 display the discovered effects and the hypothesized indirect 
connections. 
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Figure 6.1 Direct and indirect effects of political instability on growth 
 
 
 
 
Answering the research question 
After having summed up the findings and evaluated support for the hypotheses, we can 
answer the research question specifically. 
 
Can financial crises trigger political instability? What effects do political instability and 
financial crises have upon long-term economic growth? 
 
The findings suggest that financial crises can trigger political instability. However, only 
socio-political unrest seems to be the product of financial crises. As Davis and Carothers 
(2010) indicated, the financial crisis of 2008 may greatly have contributed to popular 
discontent. However, contrary to their observation that frustrations have mostly been 
peaceful, my findings suggest that historically this may not be the case. One clear indication 
is that more political violence is a product of crises. Davis and Carothers also commented that 
nothing indicated the latest crisis as a main cause of democratic reversals. More generally, I 
discover that crises do not lead to regime changes - constitutional or unconstitutional - which 
may well indicate that the political turmoil and economic frustrations due to crises are 
absorbed by the existing regimes. 
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The results show unambiguously that financial crises are negative for economic growth in the 
long-run. The implication of this finding is that the common moral-hazard view might be 
dangerous. Countries should not experience crises to learn important lessons and implement 
reform, thereby increasing growth in the future. If countries should experience crises, it is 
only to learn to avoid them in the future.  
 
Political instability may affect long-term growth both negatively and positively depending on 
the nature of the events of instability. Alesina and Perotti (1996) argued that social unrest 
might not have an impact on policy uncertainty, and therefore economic decisions, in the 
same way as executive instability may have. This argument is confirmed. It is only changes of 
regimes or changes within regimes that have consequences for the growth rate. This does not 
mean that social unrest cannot have an effect on economic decisions given a higher level of 
expected government turnover.  
 
While regime change was found to decrease growth, government instability is positive for 
growth. Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) also found positive and ambiguous relationships 
between variables of government (in)stability and growth, and Jong-A-Pin’s (2009) within-
dimension of instability showed positive effects on growth. While Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 
(2005) found their results to be driven by “good-democracy” countries, I found that excluding 
SSA countries removed the positive effect of government instability on growth. The reason 
being that this region is a driving force for both low-growth and low-index values. The 
political and typically democratic changes captured by the government instability index could 
perhaps just as well be called government stability, constitutional changes (Alesina and 
Perotti 1996), or regular changes (Feng 2003). Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) site Duff’s 
and McCamant’s (1968:1125) conception of a politically stabile system as “one which can 
manage to change within its structures.” Thus, more changes of a democratic nature are 
beneficial for growth. As Jong-A-Pin (2009) comment, the within-dimension not only refers 
to actual changes in governments, but also the potential for change. This relates to 
expectations, which are central in understanding actor’s economic decisions. Changes which 
can be expected and are considered regular have a positive effect on growth. Changes which 
are unexpected and irregular have a negative effect on growth. 
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Contribution of the thesis 
I have followed a new research trend in emphasizing the multidimensionality of political 
instability. In section 2.2, I described the common view of political instability as socio-
political unrest or civil-society induced unrest on the one hand, and executive instability on 
the other hand. This was further developed into four dimensions of political instability where 
political violence and civil protest constitute socio-political unrest, and regime change and 
government instability represent executive/regime instability. In the first part of the thesis, I 
have explored new ground when trying to estimate the effect of financial crises on these 
dimensions of political instability. There are indeed political consequences of financial crises 
and they may be severe. Because this is an explorative study it is tempting to call these results 
tentative findings. As I will suggest in the last section, more theoretical work and empirical 
studies are needed to draw more certain conclusions. Blanco and Grier (2009) argue that to 
change the long history of political instability in Latin America, understanding its reasons is 
central. More generally, one may state that it is vital to understand the determinants of 
political instability to promote political stability. The results from exploring the different 
dimensions of instability here suggest that policymakers may promote political stability by 
promoting trade openness, increasing income, and ensuring stabile fiscal conditions. 
 
The second confirmatory analysis has tested the appropriateness of modeling political 
instability as multidimensional when estimating its impact on growth. This way of 
operationalizing political instability reveals contradictory effects of different dimensions. 
Although this does not mean that the four dimensions emphasized here are the true, or the 
only, dimensions of political instability, it does indicate that a multidimensional view is 
appropriate and that not realizing this may lead to bias. I have also challenged the standard 
fixed effect approach in growth econometrics by estimating random effects models with 
separated within- and between-effects. This technique treats endogeneity and provides 
internal instruments that give unbiased estimates. It has also revealed that there are significant 
within-unit and between-unit differences of some dimensions of political instability, which is 
a new contribution to the instability-growth literature. 
 
Moderations and suggestions for further research  
Some moderations are also in order. First, I will not claim that the results found in this thesis 
establish causality; they do, however, indicate systematic relationships between the estimated 
variables. As Mankiw (1995) and Wacziarg (2002) argue, reliable causal statements are 
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almost impossible to make. Second, the excluded variables for which there were no data may 
constitute omitted variables without which the analyses give a biased picture of the true 
relationships. Third, as Carmignani (2003) comments, political instability may influence 
many dimensions of the economy other than economic growth, thereby leaving several 
explanatory variables endogenous. Fourth, as Jong-A-Pin (2009) also remarks, it is difficult to 
address the effect of missing observations on the estimates. Lastly, the choice of 5-year 
averages may lead to an unnecessary limitation of variation, especially in the analysis of 
crises and instability, where there are no a priori reason to suspect heterogeneity of the same 
nature as growth variables express.  
 
The connection between financial crises and political instability should be explored further. 
As a start, some of the mentioned crisis-indicators from section 2.1 could be tested to see if 
the relationships revealed hold for different measures of crises, and possibly if other types of 
financial/economic crises display effects on different dimensions of instability. Second, the 
short term shock-effect of crises can be tested. This may better reveal the immediate 
consequences of financial crises on the political environment. Third, the theoretical basis of 
the crisis-instability relationship should be further developed, and specific tests of how crises 
affect instability through other factors (i.e. trade, debt, government spending) can be explored.  
 
Both unemployment and government debt could not be included in these analyses because of 
missing data. By accepting a smaller sample it may be possible to include such variables in 
the future, thereby allowing tests of these relationships in the context of financial crises, 
political instability and growth. Further sensitivity analyses should also be conducted, to see 
what regions are the driving forces behind the results. This would also reveal possible 
parameter heterogeneity. Also, the possibility of reverse causality of the crises-instability 
relationship ought to be investigated. 
 
The mechanisms through which political instability affect growth have been sporadically 
examined in the past (i.e. Svensson 1998 on property rights; Asteriou and Price 2005 on 
uncertainty). In my view, one important direction for further research on instability and 
growth will be to examine these mechanisms in connection with a multidimensional set-up for 
political instability. This way we may learn more specifically how the relationship between 
institutions and the different dimensions of political instability are connected, and which of 
these channels are important in the growth context. 
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Since the results of the government instability dimension, or within-instability, showed 
unexpected effects, this dimension deserves closer inspection. The findings of this thesis may 
seem to indicate that there exists “good” instability and “bad” instability. A goal for future 
research should be to dissect what mechanisms of government instability are growth-positive. 
A starting point could be the variables from which the index applied here was made. 
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8.0 APPENDIX 
 
 
8.1 Appendix table 1: Original averaged variables of political instability 
 
Variable   |       Obs    Mean     Std. Dev.    Min         Max 
Assassinations   |       968     0.227     0.749          0       10.2 
Strikes    |       968     0.138     0.343          0         2.6 
Guerilla warfare |       968     0.133     0.316          0         2.6 
Government crises |       968     0.139     0.272          0       1.8 
Purges    |       968     0.032     0.124          0        1.4 
Riots    |       968     0.358      1.042          0       17.6 
Revolutions   |       968     0.192     0.356          0         2.8 
Anti Gov. Dem.  |       968     0.582     1.171          0       11.2 
Coups    |       964     0.022     0.081          0         0.6 
Constitutional Crises  |       964     0.084     0.161          0         1.2 
Cabinet change  |       964       0.471     0.365          0         2.6 
Executive change |       964     0.178     0.235          0          2 
Elections   |       964     0.217     0.151          0           0.8 
Years in office   |       973     7.435     7.289          1           44 
Fractionalization |       850     0.472     0.289          0      0.9953628 
Dropped veto p. |       961     0.113     0.124          0         0.8 
Polarization  |       922     0.370     0.690          0         2 
Regime change  |       967     0.091     0.194          0         1 
Minor conflict   |       976     0.123     0.264          0          1 
War   |       976     0.052     0.183          0          1 
 
 
 
8.2 Appendix table 2: Descriptive statistics for all other variables (averaged): 
 
Variable   |       Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.      Min        Max 
Banking crises   |      1036     0.075     0.191          0          1 
GDP pc growth % |      941     1.573    4.142      -28.982      31.298 
GDP pc  |      1036      6797.808     10913.55      32.405   66591.09 
- logged   |      1036      7.666    1.585        3.478   11.106 
Investment/GDP  |      957      19.929     11.289     -0.772   68.891 
Gov.share/GDP  |      957      18.627    9.402         3.377    65.737 
Pop.growth %   |      1035     1.731     1.424      -8.144       14.33 
Education pc  |      962     1840.308     565.532       259.4    4316.333 
- logged   |      962      7.459     0.369       5.558    8.370 
Trade openness |      925      71.604     37.921         0.67    338.902 
- logged  |      925     4.126     0.577      -0.400   5.825 
Inflation (adj)  |      825      0.563     4.175      -0.162   86.032 
Gini    |      966      41.067     10.097     23.625       73.9 
Ethnic fractionalization |      1029     0.455     0.253           0      0.930 
Polity2    |      956      1.423     7.161       -10         10 
Polcon3   |      969      0.230     0.212          0     0.725 
Regional instability |      1018      0.469     2.873      -3.223     19.721 
 
* Descriptive statistics for the indices of political instability are found in section 4.2. 
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8.3 Appendix table 3: Occurrence of banking crises (1970-2009). 
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8.4 Appendix table 4: List of countries and neighboring countries. 
 
 
Country Bordering countries (only those included in data) 
  
Albania Macedonia, Greece       
Algeria Morocco, Mali, Tunisia, Niger, Mauritiania     
Angola Congo, dem rep, Zambia, Namibia, Congo rep.   
Argentina Chile, Paraguay, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay     
Armenia Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran     
Australia New Zealand, Indonesia, Papa New Guinea   
Austria Germany, Italy, Swittzerland, Hungary, Slovenia, Czech republic, Slovakia 
Azerbaijan Russia, Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Turkey     
Bangladesh India, Burma         
Belarus Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania     
Belgium France, Netherlands, Germany,      
Benin Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso, Niger     
Bhutan India, China         
Bolivia Brazil, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay     
Botswana South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia     
Brazil Bolivia, Venezuela, Columbia, Peru, Paraguay, Argentina, Uruguay 
Bulgaria Romania, Macedonia, Turkey, Greece     
Burkina Faso Mali, Niger, Cote d'ivor, Ghana, Benin, Togo   
Myanmar (Burma) Thailand, India, Laos, Bangladesh, China     
Burundi Tanzania, Rwanda, Congo, dem rep     
Cameroon Nigeria, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, rep, Gabon 
Canada United States         
Cape Verde Islands Senegal         
Central African Rep Congo, dem rep, Chad, Sudan, cameroon, Congo rep   
Chad Sudan, Central African republic, Niger, Cameroon, nigeria   
Chile Argentina, Bolivia, Peru       
China Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, India 
  Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam     
Colombia Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama     
Comoros Islands Madagascar, Mozambique       
Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, rep, Angola, Zambia, Central African Republic   
  Uganda, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda     
Congo, Rep. Congo dem rep, Gabon, Cameroon, Cenral African Republic, Angola 
Costa Rica Panama         
Cote D'Ivoire Liberia, Ghana, Guniea, Burkina Faso, Mali     
Croatia Hungary, Slovenia       
Cuba Haiti, Jamaica       
Cyprus Turkey, Syria, Lebanon       
Czech Republic Germany, Poland, Slovakia, Austria     
Denmark Germany          
Djibouti Ethiopia         
Dominican Republic Haiti         
Ecuador Peru, Columbia       
Egypt Sudan, Israel         
El Salvador Honduras, Guatemala       
Equatorial Guinea Cameroon, Gabon       
Estonia Latvia, Russia       
Ethiopia Sudan, Kenya       
Fiji Papa new guinea, Australia, New Zealand     
Finland Norway, Sweden Russia       
France Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Germany,    
Gabon Congo rep, Cameroon       
Gambia Senegal         
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Georgia Russia, Armenia, Turkey, Azerbaijan     
Germany Austria, Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Belguim   
  Denmark, Czech republic, Poland     
Ghana Togo, Cote d'ivory, Burkina Faso     
Greece Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania, Macedonia     
Guatemala Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador     
Guinea Mali, Sierra Leone, Cote d'ivory, Liberia, Senegal, Guniea Bissau 
Guinea Bissau Guinea, Senegal       
Guyana Brazil, Venezuela       
Haiti Dominican rep       
Honduras Nicaragua, El salvador, Guatemala     
Hungary Slovenia, Austria, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Croatia   
India Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Bhutan   
Indonesia Malaysia, Papa new guinea       
Iran Pakistan, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan   
Ireland United Kingdom       
Israel Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon     
Italy Switzerland, France, Austria, Slovenia     
Jamaica Haiti, Cuba         
Japan Korea rep         
Jordan Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel       
Kazakhstan Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan   
Kenya Uganda, Ethipoia, Tanzania, Sudan     
Kuwait Saudi Arabia         
Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan     
Laos Myanmar, China, Vietnam, Thailand     
Latvia Estonia, Lithuania, Russia, Belarus     
Lebanon Israel, Syria         
Lesotho South Africa         
Liberia Guniea, Sierra Leone, Cote d'ivory     
Lithuania Russia, Belarus, Latvia       
Macedonia Bulgaria, Greece, Albania       
Madagascar Mauritius, Mosambique       
Malawi Mosambique, Zambia, Tanzania     
Malaysia Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore     
Mali Mauritiania, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Guniea, Niger, Cote'divor, Senegal 
Mauritania Mali, Senegal, Algeria       
Mauritius Madagascar         
Mexico United states, Guatemala       
Moldova Romania, Ukraine       
Mongolia China, Russia       
Morocco Algeria         
Mozambique Malawi, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia, Swaziland 
Namibia South Africa, Botswana, Angola, Zambia     
Nepal India, China         
Netherlands Belgium, Germany       
New Zealand Australia, Fiji         
Nicaragua Honduras, Costa Rica       
Niger Nigeria, Chad, Algeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin,    
Nigeria Cameroon, Niger, Benin, Chad     
Norway Sweden, Finland, Russia       
Oman Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen       
Pakistan India, Iran, China,        
Panama Costa Rica, Columbia       
Papua New Guinea Indonesia         
Paraguay Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia       
Peru Columbia, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile     
Philippines Indonesia, Vietnam       
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Poland Russia, Germany, Czech rep, Slovakia, Belarus, Lithuania, Ukraine 
Portugal Spain          
Romania Moldova, Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria     
Russia Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan 
  Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Poland, Ukraine   
Rwanda Burundi, Congo dem rep, Tanzania, Uganda   
Saudi Arabia Yemen, Jordan, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,    
Senegal Mauritiania, Gambia, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau   
Sierra Leone Guinea, Liberia       
Singapore Malaysia         
Slovakia Czech rep, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Ukraine   
Slovenia Italy, Austria, Hungary, Croatia     
South Africa Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Mosambique, Swaziland, Zimbabwe 
South Korea Japan, China         
Spain Portugal, France       
Sri Lanka India         
Sudan Ethiopia, Chad, Egypt, Central African Republic,    
  Congo, dem rep, Uganda, Kenya     
Swaziland South Africa, Mosambique       
Sweden Norway, Finland       
Switzerland Italy, France, Germany, Austria     
Syria Turkey, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon     
Tajikistan China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan     
Tanzania Kenya, Mosambique, Malawi, Burundi, Uganda, Zambia, Rwanda 
Thailand Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos       
Togo Ghana, Benin, Burkina Faso       
Trinidad and Tobago Venezuela         
Tunisia Algeria         
Turkey Syria, Greece, Iran, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia   
Turkmenistan Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Iran     
Uganda Kenya, Congo dem rep, Sudan, Tanzania, Rwanda   
Ukraine Russia, Moldova, Belarus, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania 
United Arab Emirates Oman, Saudi Arabia       
United Kingdom Ireland         
United States Mexico, Canada       
Uruguay Brazil, Argentina       
Uzbekistan Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikstan   
Venezuela Brazil, Columbia, Guyana       
Vietnam China, Laos         
Yemen Saudi Arabia, Oman       
Zambia Congo dem rep, Angola, Malawi, Zimbabwe,    
  Mosambique, Tanzania, Namibia     
Zimbabwe Mosambique, Botswana, Zambia, South Africa   
            
Total: 148 countries 
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8.5 Appendix table 5: Collinearity diagnostics 
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8.6 Appendix table 6: Shapiro and Wilk W-test for normal data 
 
The Stata command -swilk- can be applied when we have: 4 ≤ n ≤ 2000 observations. 
Significant results indicate normality. 
 
 
Political violence (final regression (4)) 
 
Variable   |    Obs       W            V         z          Prob>z 
Political violence  |    966     0.760    146.363    12.330    0.00000 
Crises W   |   1036    0.799    130.494    12.081    0.00000 
Crises B   |   1036    0.945     35.396      8.845     0.00000 
Trade W  |    925     0.935     38.033      8.982      0.00000 
Trade B  |   1036    0.952     30.630      8.486       0.00000 
Gov.spending W  |    957     0.921     47.489      9.543       0.00000 
Civil protest W   |    968     0.675    198.698    13.087         0.00000 
Civil protest B  |   1036    0.698    196.271    13.093         0.00000 
Regime change W |    961     0.917     50.105      9.677          0.00000 
Regime change B |   1036    0.919     52.337      9.815          0.00000 
Gov.instability W |    796     0.991      4.111       3.468          0.00026 
Gov.instability B |   1015    0.985      9.188       5.496          0.00000 
 
 
Civil protest (final regression (4)) 
 
Variable   |    Obs       W            V         z        Prob>z 
Civil protest   |    968    0.61188    237.640    13.530     0.00000 
Crises W  |   1036    0.79965    130.494   12.081     0.00000 
Crises B  |   1036    0.94566     35.396     8.845      0.00000 
Trade W  |    925    0.93526     38.033      8.982      0.00000 
Trade B  |   1036    0.95297     30.630     8.486      0.00000 
Political violence W |    966    0.82046    109.723    11.618     0.00000 
Political violence B |   1036    0.74639    165.185   12.665     0.00000 
Regime change W |    961    0.91762     50.105      9.677      0.00000 
Regime change B |   1036    0.91965     52.337     9.815      0.00000 
Gov.instability W |    796    0.99198      4.111       3.468      0.00026 
Gov.instability B |   1015    0.98563      9.188      5.496      0.00000 
 
Regime change (final regression (4)) 
 
Variable   |    Obs       W            V         z        Prob>z 
Regime change |    961    0.82349    107.362    11.561     0.00000 
Crises W  |   1036    0.79965    130.494    12.081    0.00000 
Crises B  |   1036    0.94566     35.396     8.845      0.00000 
GDP per capita B |   1036    0.97257     17.865     7.149      0.00000 
Trade W  |    925    0.93526     38.033      8.982      0.00000 
Gov.spending B |   1029    0.89498     67.980    10.461     0.00000 
Inflation W   |    825    0.18965    428.996    14.892     0.00000 
Political violence W |    966    0.82046    109.723    11.618     0.00000 
Political violence B |   1036    0.74639    165.185   12.665     0.00000 
Civil protest W   |    968    0.67548    198.698    13.087     0.00000 
Civil protest B  |   1036    0.69867    196.271   13.093     0.00000 
Gov.instability W |    796    0.99198      4.111       3.468      0.00026 
Gov.instability B |   1015    0.98563      9.188      5.496      0.00000 
 
Government instability (final regression (4)) 
 
Variable   |    Obs       W            V         z        Prob>z 
Gov.instability  |    796    0.98346      8.479     5.244      0.00000 
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Crises W  |   1036    0.79965    130.494    12.081    0.00000 
Crises B  |   1036    0.94566     35.396     8.845      0.00000 
Inflation W  |    825    0.18965    428.996    14.892     0.00000 
Polity W  |    956    0.95718     25.924     8.046       0.00000 
Polity B   |   1029    0.96754     21.013     7.550      0.00000 
Civil protest W  |    968    0.67548    198.698    13.087     0.00000 
Civil protest B  |   1036    0.69867    196.271    13.093    0.00000 
Regime change W |    961    0.91762     50.105     9.677       0.00000 
Regime change B |   1036    0.91965     52.337     9.815      0.00000 
Social inequality Z |   1029    0.96234     24.378     7.918      0.00000 
 
Final growth regression (8) 
 
Variable   |    Obs       W            V         z        Prob>z 
Growth   |    941    0.86483     80.655    10.845     0.00000 
GDP per capita W |   1036    0.96788     20.921     7.541     0.00000 
GDP per capita B |   1036    0.97257     17.865     7.149     0.00000 
Investment W  |    957    0.95088     29.761     8.388      0.00000 
Investment B  |   1029    0.96720     21.231     7.575     0.00000 
Education W  |    962    0.92141     47.846     9.564      0.00000 
Education B  |   1029    0.93251     43.688     9.365     0.00000 
Popultaion growth W |   1035    0.74661    164.895    12.661   0.00000 
Popultaion growth B |   1036    0.95114     31.825     8.581     0.00000 
Political violence W |    966    0.82047    109.718    11.618    0.00000 
Political violence B |   1036    0.74829    163.947    12.647   0.00000 
Civil protest W   |    966    0.70238    181.886    12.868    0.00000 
Civil protest B  |   1036    0.70583    191.604    13.033   0.00000 
Regime change W |    959    0.91035     54.429     9.881      0.00000 
Regime change B |   1036    0.91519     55.239     9.949     0.00000 
Gov.instability W |    832    0.99409      3.150     2.820       0.00240 
Gov.instability B |   1022    0.98825      7.561     5.014      0.00000 
Crises W  |   1036    0.76444    153.431    12.482   0.00000 
Crises B  |   1036    0.96326     23.928     7.874     0.00000 
Trade W  |    925    0.93526     38.033     8.982      0.00000 
Gov.spending W |    957    0.92163     47.489     9.543      0.00000 
Gov.spending B |   1029    0.89498     67.980    10.461    0.00000 
Inflation W  |    825    0.18965    428.996    14.892    0.00000 
Regional instability B |   1036    0.92161     51.060     9.754     0.00000 
Economic Inequality Z |    966    0.96766     19.764     7.379      0.00000 
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8.7 Appendix table 7: Testing for significant within- and between differences. 
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8.8 Appendix table 8: Re-estimating the final regressions in analysis 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
Comments: 
- Only two results change: government instability becomes insignificant in the political 
violence regression, and crises become insignificant in the civil protest analysis. Both 
were significant only at 10% in the main analysis. 
- The regression of civil protest does not satisfy the Hausman test. This was also a 
problem in the original analysis when the effect of trade was not separated. This may 
indicate that this constitutes an endogenous variable in this context and that to avoid 
bias its effects should be differentiated. Since estimates are biased, I do not give this 
result much weight. 
